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Most  comparative  lawyers  know  a great  deal  about  Roman  law  but
almost  nothing  about the  courts  of classical  Athens.  This is no mystery:
unlike Roman law, Athenian law produced no jurisprudence and very little
legal  doctrine,  and contributed  nothing to  the courts of Europe, England,
or any  other modem legal  system. For the most part,  Athenians  decided
legal disputes by empowering juries to apply  statutes that were hopelessly
broad.  Juries  could give weight  to any  sort of fact  or plea that  a litigant
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cared  to  bring  before  them.  To  us,  this  looks  like  lawlessness.  Did  the
Athenians simply  fail to grasp the value of the rule of law as we know it?
Were  legal disputes fundamentally contests  for status  decided without any
pretence  to  justice?  These  are  the  explanations  ancient  historians
commonly give.
In  my  view,  the  Athenian  legal  system  was  more  complex  than  is
generally thought. The  Athenians made a  conscious decision  to reject the
rule  of law  in  most  cases,  and  they did  so  because  they  thought  giving
juries  unlimited  discretion  to  reach  verdicts  based  on  the  particular
circumstances  of each  case was the most just way to resolve  disputes. But
in other cases, such as commercial suits, where the practical importance  of
more  predictable  results  was  high,  the  Athenians  did  have  rules  of
admissibility  and  relevance  that  limited  jury  discretion.  The  Athenian
legal  system  struck  a  balance between  following rules  and  doing justice
that is  altogether different from  that which  may be seen in the pages, for
example,  of  the  Federal Reporter. Classical  Athens  thus  provides  a
valuable  case  study of a  legal  system that  favored equity  and  discretion
over the strict application of generalized rules.  But it managed to do so in
a way that did not destroy predictability  and legal certainty  in the parts of
the system where they were necessary.
The  choice  between  certainty and fairness  permeates  a  wide variety  of
contemporary  legal  issues.  In  modem  legal  scholarship,  this  question
arises  most often in the form of the debate over the relative  advantages  of
rules and  standards in legal directives.  Scholars have compared the merits
of rules  that  provide  clear  and predictable  ex  ante  directives  with  more
flexible  standards  in property  law,'  contracts,  torts,3  constitutional  law,4
and  administrative  law.5  These  analyses  typically  pit  the  values  of
predictability,  certainty,  uniformity, and efficient,  neutral decisionmaking
associated  with  bright-line  rules  against  the  virtues  of  flexibility,
individualization,  discretion,  and  fairness  associated  with  standards.6  I
argue that the varied approach to legal process we find in classical Athens
represents a principled attempt to balance these competing values.
1.  See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40  STAN. L.  REv. 577 (1988).
2.  See, e.g.,  P.S. ATIYAH,  THE RISE AND  FALL  OF  FREEDOM  OF CONTRACT  (1979)  (providing an
historical account).
3.  See,  e.g.,  Aaron  D.  Twerski,  Seizing the  Middle  Ground Between Rules and Standards in
Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice  in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV.
521  (1982).
4.  See, e.g.,  David  L. Faigman,  Constitutional  Adventures  in Wonderland: Exploring the Debate
Between Rules and Standards  Through  the Looking Glass of the First  Amendment, 44 HASTINGS  L.  J.
829 (1993).
5.  See, e.g.,  Book  Note,  The  Bureaucrats  of Rules and Standards: Responsive Regulation,  106
HARv. L. REV.  1695 (1993).
6.  See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Rules and  Standards, 33  UCLA L. REV. 379,400-02 (1985)  (discussing
conventional arguments in support of standards and rules).
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One  of  the  most  striking  features  of  the  surviving  popular  court
speeches  from  classical  Athens  is  the  presence  of material  that  would
seem  irrelevant  or  inadmissible  in  a  modem  courtroom.  Philocleon,  the
inveterate juror in Aristophanes'  comedy  The  Wasps, provides  what must
be  a recognizable,  though  exaggerated, account  of the ploys litigants  use
to win over the jury:
I  listen  to  the  defendants  saying  anything  to  get  an  acquittal ...
Some bewail their poverty and exaggerate their troubles. Some tell us
stories, others some funny piece  of Aesop. Others make jokes to get
me to  laugh and lay aside my anger. And if we are not won  over by
these  devices, right away  he  drags in his  children by the hand, boys
and  girls,  and  I hear  them as  they  bow  their  heads  and  wail  in  a
chorus. ....  7
The  interpretation of this tendency  to include  information that does not
bear  on  the legal  issue  in  dispute  is  central  to  our understanding  of the
aims  and ideals of the Athenian legal system. I use the term "extra-legal"
to  refer  to  information  and  argumentation  that  does  not  bear  on  the
application  of the formal  charge to the  facts  of the  case.  In categorizing
some types of argumentation  as "legal"  or "extra-legal,"  I am not using a
modem metric foreign to the Athenian mindset. The Athenians themselves
were concerned with what sort of information was considered on or off the
point  (eis to pragma or  exo  tou pragmatos) 8  and  employed  a  rule
prohibiting  statements  "outside  the  issue"  in  the  homicide  courts.9  By
examining  Athenian  notions  of relevance  and admissibility,  I arrive  at a
new model  of the Athenian  legal system.  This model  is one  in which  a
relatively  sophisticated  legal  culture  in most cases  consciously embraced
levels of  jury discretion unknown in modern court systems.
In recent years, Athenian  law has become a major field of study among
classicists and ancient historians.'  Scholars  have argued that the Athenian
7.  ARISTOPHANES,  WASPS  562-70  (F.W.  Hall & W.M.  Geldart  eds.,  Oxford  Univ.  Press  1952)
[Ar.  V.  562-70].  1 include  the  standard  classical  reference  in  brackets  following  each  citation.
Translations are my own.
8.  See, e.g.,  ANTIPHON,  THE  SPEECHES  92  (Michael  Gagarin  ed.,  Cambridge Univ.  Press  1997)
[Ant.  6.9];  4  DEMOSTHENES,  PLAIDOYERS  CIVILS  31  (Louis  Gemet  ed.,  Les  Belles  Lettres  1960)
[Dem.  57.59]; LYSIAS,  SELECTED SPEECHES  31-32 (C. Carey  ed. Cambridge Univ.  Press  1993) [Lys.
3.46].
9.  See infra Section  IV.B.
10.  The  past decade  alone  has witnessed the  publication  of 16 significant  books on the  subject:
DANIELLE  S.  ALLEN,  THE  WORLD  OF  PROMETHEUS:  THE  POLITICS  OF  PUNISHING  IN DEMOCRATIC
ATHENS  (2000);  S.  AvRAMOVIC,  ISEO  E IL  DIRITTO  ATrICO  (1997);  ALAN  L.  BOEGEHOLD,  THE
ATHENIAN  AGORA VOLUME  28: THE  LAWCOURTS  AT  ATHENS  (1995);  EDWIN  CARAWAN,  RHETORIC
AND  THE LAW  OF  DRACO  (1998);  MATTHEW  R. CHRIST, THE  LITIGIOUS  ATHENIAN  (1998);  DAVID
COHEN,  LAW,  VIOLENCE  AND  COMMUNITY  IN  CLASSICAL  ATHENS  (1995);  MICHAEL  GAGARIN,
ANTIPHON  THE  ATHENIAN  (2002);  GREEK  LAW  IN  ITS  POLITICAL  SETTING:  JUSTIFICATIONS  NOT
JUSTICE  (L.  Foxhall  &  A.D.E.  Lewis  eds.,  1996);  GROSSE  PROZESSE  IM  ANTIKEN  ATHEN  (L.
Burckhardt &  J. von  Ungern-Stemberg  eds.,  2000);  VIRGINIA J. HUNTER,  POLICING ATHENS:  SOCIAL
CONTROL  IN  THE  ATTIC  LAWSUITS,  420-320  B.C.  (1994);  STEVEN  JOHNSTONE,  DISPUTES  AND
2004]
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courts  did not  attempt  to  resolve  disputes  according  to established  rules
and principles equally and  impartially applied,  but rather  served primarily
a social  or political  role.1  According  to this  approach,  litigation  was not
aimed  chiefly  at  the  final  resolution  of the  dispute  or the  discovery  of
truth.  Instead,  the  courts  provided  an  arena  for  the  parties  to  publicly
define,  contest, and  evaluate their social  relations to one another,  and the
hierarchies  of their  society.' 2  On this view,  the  law under which the  suit
was brought mattered  little to either the litigants  or the jurors; the relevant
statute  was  merely  a  procedural  mechanism  for  moving  the  feud  or
competition onto  a public stage.' 3 Thus, according to these scholars extra-
legal considerations  trumped law in a process that bore little relation to the
functioning of modem court systems.
Two  different  academic  camps  have  challenged  this  approach  to  the
Athenian  legal  system.  Both  of them  credit  Athens  with  attempting  to
implement  a rule of law.  Institutional  historians argue that the reforms  in
the late  fifth and early  fourth  centuries,  curtailing  the  lawmaking  powers
of the popular  Assembly,  created a moderate  democracy  committed  to a
rule  of law.'4  Other  scholars  analyze  the  surviving  court  speeches  and
argue  that  legal  reasoning  played  a  much  greater  role  in  Athenian
DEMOCRACY:  THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  LITIGATION  IN  ANCIENT  ATHENS  (1999);  LAW  AND  SOCIAL
STATUS  IN CLASSICAL  ATHENS  (Virginia Hunter  & Jonathan  Edmonson  eds.,  2000); THE  LAW  AND
THE  COURTS  IN GREECE  (Edward  M.  Harris  &  Lene  Rubinstein  eds.,  2004);  LENE  RUBINSTEIN,
LITIGATION  AND  COOPERATION:  SUPPORTING  SPEAKERS  IN  THE  COURTS  OF  CLASSICAL  ATHENS
(2000);  ADELE  C.  SCAFuRO,  THE  FORENSIC  STAGE:  SETTLING  DISPUTES  IN GRAECO-ROMAN  NEW
COMEDY  (1997); RAPHAEL  SEALEY,  THE JUSTICE OF THE GREEKS  (1994);  S.C. TODD,  THE SHAPE  OF
ATHENIAN  LAW  (OXFORD  1993).  The  University  of Texas  press  has  undertaken  to  publish  new
translations  of all  the surviving  lawcourt  speeches,  and Dike: Rivista di storia del diritto greco ed
ellenistico, a new journal sponsored  by the University of Milan, has been created.
11.  See  COHEN,  supra note  10,  at  87-88  (arguing  that much  Athenian litigation  was  a form  of
"feuding behavior,"  and that the notion that the judicial process is aimed at the discovery of truth does
not apply to Athens);  Robin Osborne, Law in Action  in Classical  Athens,  105  J.  HELLENIC  STUD.  40,
52 (1985)  (characterizing  the courts as a public stage for a social drama and the aim as the regulation
of ongoing  conflict rather than reaching a final  resolution to the dispute). These scholars  represent the
most extreme  form of the "law and society" approach that has dominated Athenian law in recent years.
For discussion of the  law and society  approach,  see  Stephen Todd & Paul  Millett, Law, Society, and
Athens, in NOMOS:  ESSAYS IN  ATHENIAN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY  1, 14-18 (Paul  Cartledge et al.
eds.,  1990).
12.  See, e.g.,  COHEN, supra note  10,  at 87-88 (stating  that both litigants and jurors acknowledged
that litigation was primarily a form of feuding behavior).
13.  See  id. at  90  (stating  that  litigants  were  engaged  in a  competition  for honor  and prestige
largely  unrelated  to  "the  ostensible  subject  of the  dispute").  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the
choice of whether to bring a private suit or to style the prosecution  as a public suit, which would mean
a  higher profile and  more  severe  penalties,  had important  consequences  in the  game of honor. See
Osborne, supra  note  11,  at 52-53.
14.  See MARTIN OSTWALD,  FROM  POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  TO  THE  SOVEREIGNTY  OF LAW  497-
525  (1986);  RAPHAEL  SEALEY, THE ATHENIAN  REPUBLIC:  DEMOCRACY OR THE  RULE OF LAW?  146-
48 (1987).  In the fourth  century, the Athenians distinguished between general laws (nomot) passed by
a Board  of Lawgivers  (nomothetai) and  short-term  decrees  (psephismata) of the  popular Assembly
that could not contradict  existing  laws. See MOGENS HERMAN  HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN  DEMOCRACY
IN  THE  AGE  OF  DEMOSTHENES  161-77  (1991)  (providing a  detailed discussion  of the  fourth-century
legislation).
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litigation than scholars commonly think. 5 They tend to dismiss the extra-
legal  arguments  in the  surviving  speeches  as  stray  comments  reflecting
only the amateurism and informality of the system.' 6
I offer here a  different  account of the aims and  ideals of the Athenian
courts.  I  argue  that the Athenians  did  in  fact  appreciate  the  ideal  of the
regular  application  of  abstract  principles  to  particular  cases.  But  the
Athenians  made  this  the  dominant  ideal  in  only  certain  types  of  suit.
Rather  than  approaching  the  legal  system  as  a  homogenous  entity,  the
prevailing  mode  in  modem  scholarship, 17  I  focus  on  the  differences
between  ordinary  popular  cases and  two  special  types of suit-homicide
and maritime cases.
In popular court cases-the vast majority of trials in the Athenian court
system,  and  the  current  focus  of scholarship  on  Athenian  litigation-
litigants  regularly  discussed  matters  extraneous  to  the application  of the
relevant  statute to the  event in question. They made arguments  based on,
for  example,  their  opponents'  actions  in  the  course  of  the  litigation
process,  or  the  financial  or  other effects  a  conviction  would  have on  the
defendant  and  his  innocent  family.' 8  I  argue  that  these  extra-legal
arguments were vital components of making a case in an Athenian popular
court,  rather  than  aberrations  in  an  essentially  modem  legal  system.
However,  the  prevalence  of extra-legal  argumentation  does  not  indicate
that the triggering event and legal charge were mere subterfuge  in a game
aimed at evaluating the relative honor and prestige of the litigants. Rather,
both  legal  and  extra-legal  argumentation  were  considered  relevant  and
important to the jury's decision because Athenian juries aimed at reaching
a just verdict that took into account the broader context of the dispute and
the  particular  circumstances  of the  individual  case.' 9  Even  the  relative
15.  See H.  MEYER-LAURIN, GESETZ  UND  BILLIGKEIT IN  ATTISCHEN  PROZESS  (1965);  Edward M.
Harris,  Open  Texture  in  Athenian Law,  3  DIKE  27  (2000);  J.  Meineke,  Gesetzinterpretation und
Gesetzanwendung im Attischen Zivilprozess, 18 REVuE INTERNATIONALE  DES DROITS  DE L'ANTIQUITI
275  (1971).  Meyer-Laurin  and  Meineke  argue  that Athenian  litigants  and  jurors  applied  the  law
strictly, while Harris  suggests  that  the open  texture of Athenian  law  left room  for  creative  statutory
interpretation.  All three  share  the view that  litigants  and jurors  considered  themselves  bound by  the
law and that the goal of the system approximated modem notions of a rule of law. Harris, for example,
argues  that "litigants  pay careful  attention to  substantive issues  and questions about the interpretation
of law" and jurors  "considered themselves bound to  adhere to the letter of the law."  Harris,  supra, at
78 & n.85.
16.  See, e.g.,  Edward M. Harris, Law and Oratory,  in PERSUASION: GREEK  RHETORIC IN  ACTION
130,  137  (Ian  Worthington  ed.,  1994)  (dismissing  extra-legal  arguments  as  "aberrations  from  the
norm, not typical examples of the way in which the court regularly behaved").
17.  Scholarly  arguments  over the nature of Athenian  litigation and Athenian notions  of law tend
to treat all the law court speeches together without distinguishing between popular court speeches and
other types  of suit. This  tendency  is  shared  by  scholars  who  emphasize  the  social role of the  law
courts, see, e.g.,  COHEN,  supra note 10, those  who argue that Athenian litigants  and jurors were bound
by  the law, see, e.g.,  Harris,  supra note  15,  and  those  who  take an  intermediate  position,  see, e.g.,
CHRIST, supra  note 10.
18.  See infra  Part III.
19.  Of course,  some litigants  were undoubtedly  motivated  by a desire  to gain  honor or to pursue
2004] .281
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importance of legal and contextual  information in any individual case was
open to dispute by the litigants.2"
Homicide  and maritime cases, by contrast,  followed (at least in theory)
a perceptibly more formal approach.  The homicide courts employed a rule
prohibiting statements "outside the issue" (exo toupragmatos). 2' A written
contract  was required  to bring  a maritime  suit.  Speeches  in this type  of
case tended to focus  more narrowly on the terms of the contract,  and less
on arguments from fairness  and the broader context of the dispute than did
comparable  non-maritime commercial cases. 22
The  distinctive  procedures  in  homicide  and  maritime  cases  cannot  be
explained  as  part  of  an  evolution  toward  a  rule  of law:  the  homicide
procedures predate the popular courts, while the maritime procedures were
introduced toward the end of the classical period. The jarring  differences
in  the level  of formality  in these courts  were the product not of progress,
but of ambivalence.  In  the  spectrum  of Athenian  approaches  to  law we
find,  in  the  first  legal  system  we  know  very  much  about,  the  fissure
between following generalized rules and doing justice that has haunted the
law ever since.
The  varied  approach  to legal process  stems  from  a deep  tension  in the
Athenian  system  between  a desire  for  flexibility  and wide-ranging  jury
discretion,  and  consistency  and  predictability.  The  special  rules  and
procedures  of  the  homicide  and  maritime  courts  indicate  that  the
Athenians  could  imagine  (and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  implement)  a  legal
process in which they applied abstract rules without reference to the social
context  of the  dispute.  But  they  rejected  such  an  approach  in  the  vast
majority  of cases.  This choice  reflects  not only a normative  belief that a
wide  variety  of contextual  information  was  often  relevant  to  reaching  a
just  decision, but also  a  political commitment  to popular  decisionmaking
in  a  direct  democracy.  Classical  Athens  thus  serves  as  an  example  of a
legal  system  that,  by  modem  standards,  employed  an  extraordinarily
individualized and contextualized  approach to justice.
personal enmity. Moreover, I do not doubt that the courts  at times functioned in a manner far from the
ideal,  or  that popular  court  trials  may  have  also  served  a  variety  of social  or  ideological  roles  in
society.  I  am  concerned  with  the primary aim  of the  popular  courts,  as  it  was  understood  by  the
majority of the participants. I argue that  litigants and jurors by and large considered the purpose of the
trial to be the  arrival  at a just resolution to the dispute.  The  primary goal was to resolve the  specific
dispute that gave rise  to the litigation, using social context  as an instrument toward that end.
20.  My contention that Athenian jurors attempted to reach  a "'fair"  or "just" decision based  on the
evidence  before  it  rather  than  strictly  applying  the  laws  to  the  case  is  in accord  with  the  views
expressed  by  CHRIST,  supra note  10,  at  195-96,  SCAFURO,  supra note  10,  at  50-66,  and  Sally
Humphreys,  The Evolution of Legal Process in Ancient Attica, in  TRIA  CORDA 238  (E.  Gabba  ed.,
1983).  These  scholars  do  not catalogue  the  various  types of extra-legal  information  in the  popular
court  speeches  and  explain  why  this  information  was  deemed  relevant  to  a  just  verdict.  Most
important, these  scholars do not distinguish between approaches taken in different types of suit.
21.  See infra Section W.A.
22.  See infra Part V.
[Vol  16:277
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The  remainder  of this  Article  proceeds  as  follows:  Part  II  provides  a
brief introduction  to Athenian  legal  procedure  and  the historical  sources
for Athenian  trials. In Part III,  I examine the broad standard of relevance
employed  in  the  popular  courts.  I  first  discuss  the  types  of extra-legal
argumentation  commonly  used  in the  surviving  speeches  and argue  that
this  information  was  considered  relevant  and  important  to  the  jury's
verdict.  I also  describe  the  status of law  in these  courts,  which was  not
considered a determinative  guide to a verdict. Rather,  law was simply one
source of information that the jury could consider in reaching  its decision.
Part  IV  focuses  on  the  unusual  procedures  of the  homicide  courts  that
made these courts more congenial  (at least in theory)  to arguments based
on the formal legal charge, and less receptive to extra-legal  argumentation.
I also discuss  the  reasons  for the homicide  courts'  stricter  approach,  and
what  these  differences  reveal  about  the  Athenian  conception  of judicial
process.  In  Part  V,  I  discuss  the  narrow  approach  to  relevance  used  in
maritime cases. I argue  that this  approach stems  from a need to facilitate
trade  by  offering  a  predictable  procedure  for  enforcing  contracts,  and
thereby attracting foreign merchants to Athens.
II. HISTORICAL SOURCES  AND THE ATHENIAN LEGAL SYSTEM
There  is no  surviving  statement  of Athenian  democratic  legal  theory.
The  theoretical  texts  that  we  have-principally  the  works  of Plato  and
Aristotle-are  hostile  to  the  democracy  and  offer  little  insight  into  the
aims  of the  court  system.  We  are  forced  to  draw  inferences  from  the
structure  and practices  of the  courts  themselves.  Although the  Athenians
liked to tell  themselves  that their legal  system  and laws were the product
of a single intelligence, "the lawgiver"  of the distant past, 3 Athenian court
procedures  developed  from  a  combination  of  laws  passed  at  different
times  by  the  popular  assembly  and  an  accumulation  of  custom  and
practice.  There was, of course, no single, unified vision of the aims of the
Athenian  courts  or procedures.  But whatever  their  hodge-podge  origins,
the practices of the courts constituted an Athenian tradition that reflected a
shared  understanding  of how  justice  was  and  should  be  done. 4  I am
seeking  to  uncover  the  values  and  concerns  that  seem  to  underlie  the
practices  and procedures  of the Athenian courts-values  and concerns  of
which  the  various  individual  participants  in  the  legal  system  may  have
23.  See,  e.g.,  Rosalind  Thomas,  Law  and Lawgiver in  the Athenian  Democracy, in  RITUAL,
FINANCE,  POLITICS  119,  119-35  (Robin  Osborne  &  Simon  Hornblower  eds.,  1994)  (discussing  the
trope of the lawgiver in Athenian ideology).
24.  That is, the Athenian courts do tell us something  about the "Athenian  mind" that  is more than
the  historian's convenient  fiction:  the product  of many  generations  and  many  hands may  bear  the
imprint of the collective more  deeply than that of any individual's work; that a group's traditions may
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been only vaguely aware at any given time.
The  Athenian  lawcourts  are  remarkably  well-attested,  at  least  by  the
standards  of  ancient  history:  roughly  one  hundred  forensic  speeches
survive  from  the  period  between  420  and  323  B.C.25  These  speeches
represent  not  an  official  record  of the  trial  proceedings,  but the  speech
written  by  a  speechwriter  (logographos) for his  client  (or,  at times,  for
himself)  and  later  published,  in  some  cases  with  revisions.26   Only
speeches  that  were  attributed  to  one  of the  ten  Attic  orators  who  were
subsequently  deemed  canonical  were  preserved. 2 7  The  speeches  in  the
corpus  run  the gamut  from  politically-charged  treason  trials  and  violent
crimes to inheritance cases and property disputes between neighbors.28
The most distinctive feature of the Athenian legal system is the lack of a
professional  class  of legal  experts.  Classical  Athens  was  a  participatory
democracy  run  primarily  by  amateurs:  with  the  exception  of military
generalships  and a few  other posts, state officials  were selected  by  lot  to
serve  one-year terms.29 In  the legal sphere,  the Athenian  hostility toward
professionalism  resulted  in  the  requirement  that  private  parties  initiate
lawsuits and, with some exceptions, represent themselves in court. 3 0
Athenian  courts  were  largely,  but  not  entirely,  the  province  of adult
male citizens. Foreigners  and resident aliens  were  permitted  to litigate  in
certain  circumstances,  most  notably  in  commercial  suits.3  With  a  few
25.  See  JOSIAH  OBER,  MASS  AND  ELITE  IN DEMOCRATIC  ATHENS  341-48  (1989)  (providing  a
catalogue of forensic and political  speeches).  Plato's Apology, by far the most famous Athenian  court
speech,  is  generally  put  in  a different  category  from  our  surviving  forensic  speeches  because  the
relationship between Plato's account and the speech actually delivered by Socrates  in court is unclear.
The other version  of Socrates'  defense,  written by  Xenophon, is  so  different from that of Plato's that
both  speeches cannot be accurate, and it  has been suggested that these literary pieces  may be idealized
versions  of  Socrates'  response  to  the  charges  with  no  attempt  at  historical  accuracy.  See,  e.g.,
DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN  CLASSICAL ATHENS 201-02  (1978).
26.  We  know that Demosthenes  and Aeschines,  for example,  both revised their published pieces
in the  case  On the Crown in  response to each other's  courtroom presentations. See HARVEY  YUNIS,
DEMOSTHENES:  ON THE CROWN  26-27 (2001). On the revision for publication more generally, see, for
example,  Jeremy  Trevett,  Did Demosthenes Publish his Deliberative Speeches,  124  HERMES  437
(1996);  and  Ian Worthington,  Greek Oratory, Revision of Speeches, and the Problem of Historical
Reliability,  42 CLASSICA ET MEDIAEVALIA  55  (1991).
27.  See Ian  Worthington,  The Canon of  the Ten Attic Orators,  in PERSUASION: GREEK RHETORIC
IN ACTION, supra note  16, at 244, 244.
28.  Usher provides  a summary  and brief discussion of most of the forensic  speeches  in chapters
organized by orator. See STEPHEN USHER,  GREEK ORATORY passim (1999).
29.  See HA-NSEN,supra note 14, at 233-37.
30.  In some high profile  political cases, the Assembly or Council could appoint a team of men  to
prosecute the case,  and a board of magistrates selected by lot was responsible  for prosecuting officials
accused of financial  mismanagement. See MACDOWELL, supra note 25, at 61-62. A litigant could also
donate  some  of his  speaking  time  to  a  sunegoros ("co-speaker").  The  prevalence  and  role  of co-
speakers  is  a matter  of some  debate.  Compare RUBINSTEIN,  supra note  10,  at  58-65,  123-71  with
TODD, supra  note  10, at 94-95.
31.  See MACDOWELL, supra note 25, at 234 (noting that the mercantile  laws made  no distinction
between  foreigners  and  citizens);  see also id. at  221-24  (discussing  the  circumstances  in which
foreigners  could litigate  in Athens);  TODD, supra note  10,  at  196  (discussing the  legal  capacity  of
metics); DAVID  WHITEHEAD,  THE IDEOLOGY  OF THE ATHENIAN  METIC  92-95 (1978)  (same);  Cynthia
Patterson,  The Hospitality of  Athenian Justice: The Metic in Court, in  LAW AND  SOCIAL  STATUS  IN
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exceptions,  slaves could serve neither as plaintiffs nor defendants.32 When
a  slave was  involved  in a dispute, the  case was brought by or against the
slave's  owner.  Similarly,  women  were  forced  to  depend  on  their  male
legal  guardians to act on their behalf in court, as in almost every forum in
Athenian society.33
In private cases (dikai), the victim (or his family in the case of murder)
brought suit, while  in public cases  (graphai),  anyone at all was permitted
to initiate an action, though  in our surviving graphai  the prosecutor tends
to  be  the  primary  party  in  interest  or  at  least  a  personal  enemy  of the
defendant  with  something  to  gain  by  his  conviction.34  With  few
exceptions,  litigants  were  required  to  deliver  their  own  speeches  to  the
jury.35  As  already  stated,  litigants  could  obtain  the  services  of speech-
writers  to  help  them  prepare  their  case,36  but  litigants  never  mentioned
their  logographos  and  generally  pretended  to  be  speaking
extemporaneously  in  court.  In  fact,  speakers  often  boasted  of  their
inexperience  in  public  speaking  and  ignorance  of  the  lawcourts.37
Specialized  legal  terminology  never  developed  in  Athens,  and  forensic
speeches were dramatic recreations of the events told in laymen's terms.
Each Athenian litigant was allotted a fixed amount of time to present his
case.  Some private  cases were completed in less than an  hour, and no trial
lasted  longer  than  a  day.38  Although  a magistrate  chosen by  lot presided
over each popular court, he did not interrupt the speaker for any reason or
permit anyone else to raise legal  objections,  and did not even  instruct the
jury as  to  the relevant  laws.  The  Athenian  laws  were  inscribed  on stone
stelai in  various  public  areas  of  Athens  (some  of  which  have  been
preserved  for history);39 beginning  at the  end of the  fifth century,  copies
CLASSICAL ATHENS, supra  note 10, at 93,  102-11.
32.  See TODD, supra note 10, at  187.
33.  Id. at 208.
34.  Although no ancient source  explains the distinction  between graphai  and dikai, graphai seem
to have been cases regarded  as affecting the community at large. This division is not quite the same as
the modem  criminal-civil  distinction;  murder,  for example,  was  a dike because  it was  considered  a
crime against the family rather than the state. See id. at 102-09.
35.  A litigant could donate some of his time to another speaker. See supra note 30.
36.  It is  not  clear whether  the  logographos generally  wrote  a  complete  text  for the  litigant to
memorize  or collaborated with his client  in composing his speech.  See  KENNETH J.  DOVER,  LYSIAS
AND  THE  CORPUS  LYSIACUM  (1968);  Stephen Usher,  Lysias and His Clients, 17 GREEK,  ROMAN,  &
BYZANTINE  STUD.  31  (1976).  Logographers  may also have assisted in other stages of the proceedings.
See 4 DEMOSTHENES, supra note 8, at 48 [Dem. 58.19]  (arranging a settlement).
37.  See, e.g.,  ANTIPHON,  supra note  8,  at 69  [Ant.  5.1];  1 DEMOSTHENES,  supra note  8,  at 32
[Dem.  27.2];  ISAEUS,  SPEECHES  117  (William  Wyse  ed.,  Cambridge  Univ.  Press  1904)  [Is.  8.5];
LYSLAS,  ORATIONES  119-20 (Carolus Hude  ed., Oxford  Univ. Press  1912)  [12.4]; LYSIAS,  supra note
8, at  17 [Lys.  1.5].
38.  A public  suit was  allotted an entire day.  ARISTOTLE,  ATHENAION  POLITEIA 47 (M.  Chambers
ed.,  Teubner 1994)  [Ath.Pol. 53.3].  Private cases  varied according  to the seriousness of the charge and
were timed by a water-clock.  MacDowell estimates the length of various types of suit based on the one
surviving water-clock. See MACDOWELL, supra note 25, at 249-50.
39.  On the difficulties presented by these sources,  see TODD, supra  note  10, at 45-46.
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were  kept  in a public  building, but  it is  unclear whether this  archive  was
sufficiently organized to serve as a reasonably accessible source of law for
potential  litigants.4"  Litigants were responsible for finding and quoting any
laws  they  thought helped  their  case,  though  there  was  no  obligation  to
explain the relevant laws,  and, in fact, some speeches do not cite any laws
at  all.  There  was  no  formal  mechanism  for  correcting  a  speaker's
misrepresentation  of the  laws,4  though  knowledgeable  members  of the
jury  and  the  crowd  could  heckle  orators  whose  speeches  were
misleading.
42
Cases  in  the  popular  courts  were  heard  by  juries43  chosen  by  lot,
generally ranging  in  size from  201  to  501  persons.4 4  Although  all citizen
men  over thirty  were  eligible  to serve  as jurors,  it  seems  likely that the
poor, the elderly, and city-dwellers  were  disproportionately represented. 5
There  was no process  like  our voir dire, meant to  exclude from  the jury
those with  some knowledge  of the  litigants  or the case. On the contrary,
Athenian  litigants  at  times  encouraged  jurors  to  base  their  decision  on
preexisting  knowledge. 6 Although the jury might have known something
of a party's reputation or of the  facts of the case, especially  in high profile
cases, the jurors were  nothing  like  the self-informing  juries of medieval
England.  Jurors  did not bring  the  local knowledge of a small  community
into  court  with  them;  they  were  randomly  chosen  from  a  city  with  a
population  in the hundreds of thousands.47 A  simple majority  vote of the
jury,  taken  without deliberation,  determined  the  outcome  of the trial. No
40.  Compare JAMES  P. SICKINGER, PUBLIC  RECORDS AND ARCHIVES  IN  CLASSICAL ATHENS  114-
38,  160-69 (1999)  with ROSALIND  THOMAS,  ORAL TRADITION  AND WRITTEN RECORD  IN  CLASSICAL
ATHENS  39-94 (1989).
41.  There was,  however,  a law punishing the citation of a non-existent  law with death, see Dem.
26.24, though there are no attested examples of prosecutions  brought under this law.
42.  See Victor  Bers, Dikastic Thorobos, in CRUX  I (Paul  Cartledge  & David Harvey  eds.,  1985)
(discussing heckling by jurors);  Adriaan  Lanni,  Spectator  Sport or Serious Politics, 117  J.  HELLENIC
STUD.  183 (1997)  (discussing heckling by spectators).
43.  1 have  been  using  the  term "jurors"  as  a  translation  for  the Greek  dikastai to  refer  to the
audience  of these  forensic  speeches,  but  some  scholars  prefer  the  translation  "judges."  See,  e.g.,
Harris, supra note 16, at  136.  Neither English word is entirely satisfactory,  since these men performed
functions  similar  to those both of a  modem judge  and  a  modem jury. I  refer to dikastai  as jurors to
avoid the connotations ofprofessionalism that the word judges conjures up  in the modem mind.
44.  See HANSEN,  supra  note 14,  at  187.
45.  Cf  A.H.M. JONES,  ATHENIAN  DEMOCRACY  36-37  (1957)  (arguing that juries were  selected
primarily  from the  middle  and upper  classes).  See generally id. at  183-86;  OBER,  supra note 25,  at
122-24; R.K. SINCLAIR,  DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION  IN ATHENS  124-27 (1988);  S.C.  Todd, Lady
Chatterly  's Lover and  the Attic Orators,  110 J.  HELLENIC STUD.  146 (1990);
46.  See,  e.g.,  AESCHINES,  ORATIONES  47-48  (M.R.  Dilts  ed.,  Teubner  1997)  [Aesch..  1.93]
("First, let nothing be more persuasive  for you than what you yourselves  know and believe  concerning
Timarchus  [the  defendant]  here.  Examine  the  issue not  from  the  present but from  the  past.  For the
statements  made  in  the past about Timarchus  and  about what  this man is accustomed  to doing  were
made with  a view toward the truth, while those that are going to be spoken  today are for the purpose of
deceiving you in order to get  a decision. Cast your ballot according to the longer time and the truth and
the fact you yourselves know.").
47.  On the Athenian population, see HANSEN, supra  note  14, 90-94.
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reasons  for  the  verdict  were  given,  and  there  was  no  provision  for
appeal.48
While  the punishment  for  some  offenses  was  set  by  statute,  in many
cases the jury was required  to choose between the  penalties suggested  by
each party  in  a second speech. It was not permitted to give a compromise
punishment.  It  is  through this  practice,  known  as timesis,
9  that  Socrates
virtually  signed  his  own  death  warrant.  After  suggesting  that  the  state
reward  him  with  free  maintenance,  he  finally  agreed  to  propose  a  very
small  fine  as  a  penalty.  The  jury,  which  only  narrowly  voted  for
conviction,  was  thereby  induced  to  vote  overwhelmingly  for  the
prosecutors'  proposal  of execution.5"  Imprisonment  was  rarely,  if  ever
used as a punishment;5'  the most common types of penalties in public suits
were monetary  fines,  loss of citizen status  (atimia), exile,  and execution,
which  involved either poisoning  by hemlock  or, more  gruesomely, being
shackled to wooden planks and left to die.52
The  vast majority  of Athenian  cases were  heard in  the popular  courts.
Jurisdiction  over  cases  involving  homicide,  wounding,53   and  some
religious offenses  was divided between five separate  homicide  courts that
were  presided  over  not  by juries  but  by  members  of the  Areopagus,  a
council of elders who served life terms.54 Maritime  cases were most likely
heard  in  the  popular  courts  before  ordinary  jurors,"  but  employed  a
variety of special  procedures  and  rules  that set them  apart from  ordinary
popular court cases.
48.  A dissatisfied litigant  might, however,  indirectly attack  the judgment  by means  of a  suit for
false  witness  or  might  bring  a  new case,  ostensibly  involving  a  different  incident  and/or  using  a
different  procedure.  Some  of  our  surviving  speeches  point  explicitly  to  a  protracted  series  of
connected legal confrontations.  See, e.g., Osborne, supra note  11,  at 52.
49.  See TODD, supra  note  10, at 133-35  (discussing timesis).
50.  PLATO,  APOLOGY  55  (E.A.  Duke  et al.  eds.,  Oxford Univ.  Press  1995)  [Pl.  Ap. 36a].  Todd
estimates from a passage of Diogenes Laertius  that Socrates was  convicted by a vote of approximately
280 to 220, but sentenced to death by a vote of 360 to  140. See TODD, supra note  10, at  134 n.12.
51.  See Virginia  Hunter,  The Prison of Athens:  A Comparative Perspective, 51  PHOENIX  296
(1997).
52.  On capital  punishment  in  Athens,  see  generally  EVA CANTARELLA,  I SUPPLIZI  CAPITALE  IN
GRECIA  E A ROMA (1991);  Louis  Gemet, Capital Punishment, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY  OF  ANCIENT
GREECE 252 (John D.B. Hamilton &  Blaise Nagy trans.,  1981); S.C. Todd, How to Execute People in
Fourth-Century Athens,  in  LAW  AND  SOCIAL  STATUS,  supra note  10,  at 31;  Ian  Barkan,  Capital
Punishment in Athens  (1935)  (unpublished  Ph.D.  dissertation,  University of Chicago).  On  penalties
generally, see ALLEN, supra note  10, at  197-243; TODD, supra note  10,  at 139-44;  M.  Debrunner Hall,
Even  Dogs Have  Erinyes: Sanctions in  Athenian Practice and  Thinking,  in GREEK  LAW  IN  ITS
POLITICAL SETTING, supra note  10, at 73.
53.  The  definition  of "wounding"  is  unclear,  but  it  may  be  a form  of attempted  murder,  i.e.,
wounding  with  intent to  kill.  In any  case, it  was  certainly  more  narrow than  the modem  notion  of
assault, which was regularly tried in the popular courts.
54.  For  a recent discussion of the debate  over how  the ephetai, the judges  in the  four homicide
courts excluding the Areopagus court, were  chosen, see CARAWAN,  supra  note  10, at 14-15,  155-60.
55.  Scholars differ on whether or not the special  maritime procedure was heard in separate courts
before specialist judges. Compare E.E. COHEN,  ANCIENT ATHENIAN  MARITIME  COURTS  93-95 (1973)
with TODD, supra note  10, at 336.
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III. THE POPULAR COURTS
The popular courts, which  had the broadest jurisdiction  in the Athenian
system  and  have  been  the  focus  of scholarly  attention,5 6 exemplify  the
discretionary  and  equitable  aspects  of  the  Athenian  legal  system.  The
modern  reader  of  a  speech  intended  for  delivery  in  these  courts  is
immediately  struck by a  bizarre amalgam  of the  familiar and the foreign.
Alongside  a  narrative  of the  events  in  question,  bolstered  by  witness
testimony  and the discussion  and citation of laws, Athenian popular court
speeches  often  contain  a  variety  of material  that  would  be  considered
inadmissible  in a modern  courtroom, including  stinging character attacks,
general  arguments  from fairness  unrelated  to  the  applicable  statute,  and
florid appeals for  the jurors'  pity. Modem accounts of the Athenian  legal
system  tend  to  privilege  one  or  other  of  these  aspects  of  Athenian
argumentation.
57
In  my  view,  both  extra-legal  and  legal  information  were  considered
relevant58  and  important to the jury's decision  because  Athenian popular
court  juries  aimed  at  reaching  a just  verdict  taking  into  account  the
particular  circumstances  of the  individual  case,  as  opposed  to  focusing
exclusively on the application of abstract rules and principles provided by
statutes.  It was  up to the jury  to decide  on  a case-by-case  basis  which  of
the variety  of legal  and extra-legal  arguments presented  at trial should be
determinative, and, indeed, the relative importance of legal and contextual
evidence was often explicitly disputed by the parties. That these aspects  of
Athenian  popular  court presentation  now seem  unusual  to us  stems  from
their  different  sense  of what  constituted  justice-one  that  emphasized
individualized and contextualized  assessments  rather than the regular  and
predictable  application of abstract, standardized rules.
There  appears to have been no rule setting forth the range  and types of
information  and  argument  appropriate  for  popular  court  speeches.  The
Athenaion Politeia, a partial  history and description of Athenian political
and  legal institutions probably  written by  Aristotle  or his students,  states
that  litigants  in  private  cases  took  an  oath  to  speak  to  the  point.59
However,  this  oath  is  never  mentioned  in  our  surviving  popular  court
speeches  and  if in  fact  it  existed,  it  appears  to  have  had  no  effect.6"
56.  See supra note  17; see also supra notes  11-16  and accompanying  text (describing  the current
debate over the nature of litigation in Athens).
57.  For discussion, see supra  notes 11-17  and accompanying text.
58.  I discuss Athenian  notions of evidence  that should be presented  to a jury as "relevant"  rather
than  "admissible"  because  the  Athenian  popular  courts  had  no  rules  limiting  admissibility,  and
because  Athenian  litigants  explaining  why  they  are  making  certain  arguments  speak  in  terms  of
whether  the evidence  is relevant  (literally, on or off the issue  or point).  In modem  courts, of course,
much of this extra-legal argumentation  is considered  relevant but inadmissible.
59.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at 61  [Ath. Pol.  67.1].
60.  Whereas  speeches  made  before  the  homicide  courts  or  referring  to  them  make  frequent
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Speakers were limited only by the time limit and their own sense of which
arguments  were  likely  to persuade  the jury.  Although  anything  was  fair
game  in  the  popular  courts-Lycurgus'  extended  quotations  from
Euripides,  Homer,  and  Tyrtaeus  on  the honor  and  glory  of battle  in  his
prosecution  of a citizen who left Athens when the city was threatened with
attack6'  is perhaps  the most creative use of speaking time  in our surviving
speeches-there  are  discernible  categories  of  extra-legal  evidence  that
appear repeatedly in the corpus. 6'  Experienced speechwriters  undoubtedly
had  a  good  feel  for  the  types  of arguments  and  information  that  were
likely  to  appeal  to  the jury  and  constructed  their  speeches  accordingly.
Indeed, there  is evidence  that juries at times  expressed their displeasure  at
a  litigant's  choice  of  arguments:  one  speaker  tries  to  head  off  such
criticism, pleading,  "And let none of you challenge me while  I am  in the
middle of my speech with shouts of 'why are you telling us this?"'
63
Athenians  therefore  perceived  some  types  of  information  and
argumentation  as  more  relevant  to  popular  court  decisions  than  others,
despite the absence  of formal  restrictions  on the presentation of evidence.
Because  we rarely know the outcome of an ancient case and generally  do
not  have  the  opposing  litigant's  speech  to  allow  a  comparison,  it  is
impossible to know which strategies were most persuasive  to an Athenian
jury, and, as we  will  see, the  categories  of relevant evidence  were  fluid
and  contestable.  Nevertheless,  the  surviving  speeches  clearly  show  the
popular  court  juries'  receptivity  to  three  sorts  of  argument:  (1)  the
expansion  of the  litigant's  plea beyond  the  strict  limits  of the  event  in
question to encompass  the broader background  of the dispute;  (2)  defense
appeals  for  the jury's  pity  based  on  the  potential  harmful  effects  of an
adverse verdict; and (3) arguments based on the character of the parties.
Before  we  examine  in  detail  each  of the  three  types  of extra-legal
argumentation  considered  relevant  in  the  Athenan  popular  courts,  a  few
general  comments  may  help  to clarify  my  approach.  I  discuss  types  of
evidence and argument that are common enough in our surviving  speeches
mention of the relevancy  rule  that applied  in  those courts,  speeches  delivered  in the  popular courts
never mention  such  a legal  requirement.  In the few allusions in popular court speeches to speaking to
the issue, most of which are found  in  a single speech (Demosthenes  57),  nothing in the  phraseology
suggests a duty imposed  by law to avoid straying from  the  issue at hand. Compare  4 DEMOSTHENES,
supra note 8, at 31  [Dem. 57.59]  and LYSiAS, supra note 37, at  114  [Lys.  9.1] with  references  to the
homicide court  rule  in LYSIAS,  supra note 8, at 31-32  [Lys. 3.46], and  ANTIPHON, supra note 8, at 71,
92 [Ant. 5.11; 6.9].
61.  LYCuRGUS,  AGAINST  LEOCRATES  64-68,  69  (Felix  Durrbach ed.,  Les  Belles  Lettres  1956)
[Lyc.  1. 100, 103,  107].
62.  Rhodes argues that the court  speeches  focus  mostly on the issue in dispute. See P.J.  Rhodes,
Keeping to the Point, in HARRIS &  RUBINSTEIN,  THE  LAW AND  THE  COURTS  IN  GREECE, supra note
10, at  137. My own view, which I outline in this section, is that most popular court speeches  contain a
mixture of legal and extra-legal  information. In any case, the repeated use of a particular type of extra-
legal  information in our surviving speeches  suggests that this sort of evidence was considered  relevant
to a popular court jury's verdict, even if it accounts for only a small portion of litigants'  arguments.
63.  HYPERIDES,  ORATIONES  1.43  (F.G.  Kenyon ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1906) [Hyp.  1 .col.43].
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to indicate  that logographers  and jurors thought them relevant  to popular
court  decisionmaking.  In  any  individual  case,  however,  litigants  might
dispute  the  relevance  and  relative  importance  of  different  types  of
argument.  The  corpus  of  forensic  speeches  contains,  for  example,
impassioned  arguments  both  for  and  against  the  relevance  of character
evidence.' 4  Indeed,  speakers  sometimes  contend  that  the  jury  should
ignore  extra-legal  evidence and focus  solely on the legal arguments made
in  the  case.6"  Such  arguments  were  themselves  part  of the  remarkably
individualized  and  case-specific  approach  to  justice  employed  in  the
popular  courts:  it was  left to the jurors to  decide which sorts of evidence
were most important given the particular circumstances of the case.66
In what  follows,  there  is  an implicit,  and,  in a  few  instances,  explicit,
comparison  between  the  Athenians'  broad  notion  of relevance  and  the
stricter approach  of the modern  American  system.  In practice,  of course,
modern  trial lawyers are  often able to communicate  to a jury a good deal
of information  that  is  not strictly  related  to proving the  elements  of the
charge  or  claim.67  Even  under  the  most  cynical  view  of modern  trial
practice,  however, contemporary  evidence regimes  are different from  that
of  ancient  Athens  in  one  vital  respect:  while  the  Athenians  openly
recognized  the relevance of extra-legal  information, in modern courts  the
law's  status  as  the  authoritative  rule  of  decision  is  not  in  doubt  and
arguments  based  on  extra-legal  factors  are  always  sub  rosa,  couched  in
terms  that permit  the presiding judge  and court  of appeals  to  accept the
verdict  as  the jury's application  of the law based  solely on  the relevant
evidence presented at trial.6"
A.  Background information and arguments  from equity
Modem  lawyers translate a client's story into legal form in large part by
winnowing  down  the  client's  experience  to  a  limited  set  of facts  that
correspond  to  claims and  arguments  recognized  by  the applicable  law.69
Athenian  litigants,  by  contrast,  provided  a  "wide-angle"7  view  of the
64.  Compare,  e.g.,  1 DEMOSTHENES, supra note 8,  at 221-22 [Dem. 36.55] with 3  DEMOSTHENES,
supra note 8, at 71-72 [Dem. 52.1].
65.  See, e.g.,  HYPERIDES, supra note 63, at 4.32 [Hyp. 4.32];  3  ISOCRATES,  OPERA  176  (Basilius
G. Mandilaras ed., Teubner 2003)  [Isoc.  18.34-5].
66.  See infra Section III.E.
67.  Robert Bums, for example, argues that the American  rules of evidence  are flexible  enough  to
permit an attorney  to argue for a verdict based on extra-legal norms, and that in practice the trial jury's
task  is  to  decide  between  a  variety  of  competing  norms-legal,  economic,  moral,  political,
professional. See ROBERT P. BuRNS,  A THEORY  OF THE TRIAL  29-30, 36, 201  (1999).
68.  See id. at  36 (recognizing  that in  modem courts  extralegal  norms  can  only trump  legal  ones
surreptitiously).
69.  For a  discussion of the process  of translating  lived experience  into a legal discourse,  see, for
example,  JAMES BoYD  WHITE,  JUSTICE AS  TRANSLATION  179-201,257-69  (1990).
70.  Kim Scheppele,  Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv.  2096 (1989).
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case,  one  that  included  not  only  a  complete  account  of  the  event  in
question, but also  information regarding the social  context of the dispute,
including  discussion  of the long-term  relationship  and interactions  of the
parties.  In cases that were part of a series of suits between the parties,  for
example,  speakers  did not  confine their  argument  to the  immediate issue
in question but rather recounted  the  past  litigation  in some  detail.7  This
practice  is  particularly  prominent  in  speeches  for  suits  charging  false
testimony, which  generally  included  an  attempt to  re-argue  the previous
case  as well  as  evidence  that a  statement made  by one of the opponent's
witnesses was  false.  For instance,  one  speaker  stated,  "I now present  to
you a just request, that you both determine  whether the testimony  is false
or  true,  and,  at  the  same  time,  examine  the  entire  matter  from  the
beginning."72
Litigants  also  commonly  discussed  the  manner  in  which  each  of the
parties  has  conducted  themselves  in  the  course  of  litigation.  They
emphasized their own reasonableness  and willingness to  settle or arbitrate
the claim, and portrayed their opponents as querulous, dishonest, and even
violent.73 To  cite  one example,  the  speaker  in Demosthenes  44 states, "I
think  it is necessary to speak also of the things they have done in the time
since  the case regarding  the  estate  was brought,  and the  way  they  have
dealt with us, for I think that no one else has been as unlawfully treated in
connection with an inheritance lawsuit as we have been." 74
When relatives  or friends  faced each  other in court,  speakers  described
the  long-term  relationship  and  interaction  of the  parties  and  sought  to
represent  themselves  as  honoring  the obligations  traditionally  associated
with  bonds  of philia ("friendship"),  and  to  portray  their  opponents  as
having  violated  these  norms.
75  Lawcourt  speakers  did  not  discuss  why
information  about  the  relationship  between  the  parties  was  considered
relevant  to  the  jury's  decision,  but  it  was  common  sense  that  such
relationships  were  relevant  to  a  moral  assessment  of the  situation.  The
Athenians  recognized  this.  In  the  Nichomachean  Ethics 76  Aristotle
71.  E.g.,  ANDOCIDES,  ON  THE MYSTERIES  54  (Douglas M.  MacDowell  ed.,  Oxford Univ.  Press
1962)  [And.  1.117ff];  1 DEMOSTHENES,  supra note 8,  at  74,  79 [Dem.  29.9,  27];  2 DEMOSTHENES,
supra note 8,  at  96, 155,  215 [Dem.  43.1-2;  45.102; 47.46];  ISAEUS, supra note  37,  at 28-30,  68 [Is.
2.27-37; 5.5ff].
72.  2 DEMOSTHENES, supra note 8, at 215 [Dem.  47.46]; see also ROBERT J. BONNER,  EVIDENCE
IN  ATHENIAN  COURTS  18  (1905)  (discussing  the  practice  of raising issues  from  the previous  suit  in
false testimony cases).
73.  E.g.,  DEMOSTHENES,  AGAINST  MEIDIAS  135ff  (Douglas  M.  MacDowell  ed.,  Oxford  Univ.
Press  1990)  [Dem.  21.78ff];  I  DEMOSTHENES,  supra note  8,  at  32,  87  [Dem.  27.1;  29.58];  2
DEMOSTHENES, supra note 8, at 225-26 [Dem. 47.81];  see also HUNTER, supra note 10, at 57.
74.  2 DEMOSTHENES, supra note 8, at 140 [Dem. 44.31-2].
75.  See CHRIST, supra note  10, at 167-80 (discussing the emphasis on the breach ofphilia in cases
involving relatives, friends,  neighbors, and demesmen).
76.  Aristotle's theoretical works must be used with  great care as a source  for the ideals or practice
of  the  Athenian  lawcourts.  See Christopher  Carey,  Nomos  in Attic  Rhetoric and Oratory, 116  J.
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explains  that just as the duties and obligations one owes to family,  friends,
fellow-citizens,  and  other types  of relations  differ, "Wrongs  are  also of a
different quality in the case of each of these [relationships],  and are  more
serious  the more intimate the  friendship."  He  continues, "For example,  it
is  more serious  to defraud  a comrade  than  a fellow-citizen,  and to refuse
help to a brother than to a stranger, and to strike your father than anybody
else.""  Information  about the relationship  between  the parties helped  the
jury evaluate the severity of the allegations and the extent of moral blame
borne by each side.
In  addition  to presenting  evidence  about relationships  and interactions
prior  to  and after  the event  at issue,  litigants  at times  provided  a  highly
contextualized  account of the dispute itself, often including arguments that
are  not  explicitly  recognized  by  law  but  that  contribute  to  the  jury's
overall  sense  of the  fair  result of the  dispute.  For example,  speakers  at
times  discuss  the  extenuating  (and,  less  commonly,  aggravating)
circumstances  surrounding  the incident, such as  the absence of intent, the
offender's youth, or his intoxication, even though the laws enforced by the
popular  courts  did  not  formally  recognize  such  defenses  and  did  not
provide for degrees of offenses based on their severity."
Discussion  of the  circumstances  and context  of the  contested  event  is
most prominent  in  suits involving a  challenge  to  a will. 79  Litigants  often
appeal  to a variety of arguments  rooted  in notions of fairness and justice
unrelated to the  issue of the formal  validity of the will.  Speakers compare
their relationship to the deceased with that of their opponents  in an  effort
to argue that they have the better claim to the estate: they present evidence
that they  were  closer  in  affection  to  the deceased,  performed  his  burial
rites, or nursed him when he was ill, and suggest that their opponents were
detested by the dead  man  and  took no interest  in his  affairs  until it  was
HELLENIC STUD. 42 (1996)  (noting that  the advice given to litigants in Aristotle's Rhetoric bears little
relation to the practice  of the Athenian courts).  However, the Ethics does  seem to be a reliable source
of Athenian  popular  values;  Aristotle  sets  out to examine  beliefs  that are  "prevalent  and have  some
basis"  ARISTOTLE,  NICHOMACHEAN  ETHICS  4  (1.  Bywater  ed.,  Oxford  Univ.  Press  1962)  [Ar. NE
1095a28]; see PAUL MILLETT,  LENDING  AND BORROWING  IN CLASSICAL ATHENS  112 (1991).
77.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 76, at  168 (Ar. NE 1160a3ff].
78.  These topoi have  been  catalogued  and  discussed  in  detail in  TREVOR  SAUNDERS,  PLATO'S
PENAL  CODE  109-18  (1991);  SCAFURO,  supra note  10,  at 246-50;  and  A.P.  Dorjahn,  Extenuating
Circumstances in Athenian Courts, 25 CLASSICAL  PHILOLOGY  162-72 (1930).  This practice did not go
entirely  unchallenged.  See  AESCHINES,  supra  note  46,  at  290  [Aesch.  3.198];  DEMOSTHENES,
SELECTED  PRIVATE  SPEECHES  28  (C.  Carey &  R.A. Reid  eds.,  Cambridge  Univ.  Press  1992)  [Dem.
54.21-22].
79.  Other recent discussions of the use of arguments from "fairness"  or "equity"  include CHRIST,
supra note  10, at  194;  SCAFURO,  supra note  10, at 50-66;  Arnaldo  Biscardi,  La  'gnome dikaotate' et
l'interpretation des  lois dons  la  Grace  ancienne,  17  REVUE  INTERNATIONALE  DES  DROITS  DE
L'ANTIQUITf  219 (1970).  Cf Harris,  supra note  15,  at  32-34  (arguing  that jurors  did feel  bound  to
follow the  letter of the law,  and that what appear  to  be extra-legal  arguments  from equity  are  in fact
legal arguments exploiting the open texture of Athenian statutes).
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time  to claim his estate."0 One such litigant concludes with a summary  of
his  arguments  that  places  equitable  considerations  on  an  equal  footing
with  the  will and  the  law:  "First,  my  friendship  with  the men  who have
bequeathed  the estate  ...  then  the many good deeds  I did  for them when
they  were  down  on  their  luck  ...  in  addition  the  will,  ...  further,  the
law ....  81
The  frequency  and  centrality  of  discussion  of  the  background  and
interaction of the parties  in our surviving popular court speeches  indicate
that  this  type  of  information  was  considered  relevant  to  the  jury's
decision.  It  has  been  suggested  that  the  prevalence  of  such  extra-legal
arguments  indicates  that Athenian  litigants  and jurors  regarded  the court
process  as  serving  primarily  a  social role-the  assertion  of competitive
advantage  in  a  narrow  stratum  of  society.  One  scholar,  for  example,
explains the tendency to discuss the broader conflict between the parties as
evidence  that  litigants  were  engaged  in  a  competition  for  prestige
unrelated to  the "ostensible  subject of the  dispute":  "rather  than thinking
in terms  of a  'just resolution'  of the dispute  one  should think  instead of
how the game of honor is being played.""2
There  may  be  a  simpler  explanation,  however,  one  rooted  in  the
pervasive  amateurism  of the  Athenian  courts.  Human  beings  naturally
tend  to  think  about  social  interaction  in  story  form.83  The  restrictive
evidence  regimes  of contemporary  jury-based  legal  systems  are  from  a
layperson's  perspective  counterintuitive.  Amateurs  left  to  their  own
devices  in contemporary  small  claims courts, for  example,  often set  their
dispute  in  a  broader  context  and  use  a  variety  of everyday  storytelling
techniques forbidden in formal court settings. 4 It is perhaps not surprising
that amateur  Athenian  litigants would  consider  evidence  concerning  the
background of the dispute, the parties'  conduct in the course of litigation,
and  arguments  from  fairness  relevant  in  reaching  a just outcome  in  the
issue at hand. There  is no need to resort to a theory of the Athenian  court
system as  a forum primarily  concerned with social competition  to explain
80.  See, e.g., ISAEUS,  supra note 37,  at 7, 11,  14-17, 62, 78-79,  80, 95, 98,  103-04,  110-11,  131,
138-40 [Is.  1.4,  17,  19,  20, 30,  33, 37, 42; 4.19;  5.36-38, 41-43; 6.51,  60-61; 7.8,11,12,33-37;  9.4, 27-
32]; see also SIMA AVRAMOVIt,  ISEO E IL  DIRITTO ATrICo  54-58 (1997);  M. Hardcastle,  Some Non-
legal Arguments in Athenian Inheritance Cases, 12  PRUDENTIA  11  (1980).  Lawless has  argued  that
equity argumentation in Isaeus  is a response to obscurities  and gaps in the inheritance laws  rather than
an  attempt  to appeal  to fairness.  See  J.M.  Lawless,  Legal  Argument,  Equity,  and  the  Speeches  of
Isaeus  110-35 (1991)  (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Brown University).
81.  3 ISOCRATES, supra note 65, at 194  [Isoc. 19.50].
82.  COHEN, supra note  10, at 90.
83.  See, e.g., W.L. BENNET & M.S. FELDMAN,  RECONSTRUCTING REALITY  IN  THE COURTROOM  7
(1981);  RICHARD  HASTIE  ET AL.,  INSIDE  THE JURY  22-23  (1983);  Richard  Lempert,  Telling Tales in
Court: Trial Procedure and the Story Model,  13  CARDOZO  L.  REV.  559  (1991);  G.P.  Lopez,  Lay
Lawyering,  32 UCLA L. REV. 3 (1984).
84.  See W.M.  O'Barr  &  J.M.Conley,  Litigant Satisfaction vs. Legal Adequacy in Small Claims
Court Narratives,  19 LAW & SOC.  REV. 661  (1985).
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this  contextual  information  included  in  our  surviving  popular  court
speeches.  This  explanation  for  the  prevalence  of  extra-legal  material
becomes  even more  attractive  when  we consider  that Athenian  lawcourt
speeches generally  include  evidence  and argument based on the statute at
issue, as well as such extra-legal argumentation.
B. Defense appeals  based on the consequences of conviction
The  second major category  of extra-legal  argumentation in the popular
courts  is the appeal  for the jurors'  pity based on the misfortune  that will
befall the defendant and his family if he is found guilty."  From a modem
perspective, this information is relevant, if at all, to sentencing rather than
the  determination  of guilt.  Unlike  modern  jurors  in  non-capital  cases,
Athenian jurors  were  often  aware  of the  range  of penalties  faced  by  the
defendant  through  the  public  indictment or the arguments  of the  litigants
during the guilt phase. 6 The frequency of arguments  to acquit to spare the
defendant  a  harsh  penalty87  in  Athenian  defense  speeches  and  its
anticipation by prosecutors suggests that appeals  to pity were, for the most
part,  considered  appropriate  in  the  popular  courts. 88  Indeed,  prosecutors
were  more  likely  to  argue  that  their  particular  opponent's  character  or
actions had rendered him undeserving  of pity rather than  to challenge the
legitimacy of the practice itself.89
Appeals to pity  in the Athenian popular courts were firmly rooted in the
defendant's  particular  circumstances;  litigants  generally  did  not criticize
the penalty itself as disproportionate  to the charges,  but rather bemoaned
the baleful  effects  that penalty  would have  on them  given  their  specific
85.  See JOHNSTONE,  supra note  10, at  109-25  (discussing appeals to pity in Athenian law); David
Konstan, Pity and the Law in Greek Theory and Practice,  3  DiKE 125 (2000).
86.  E.g.,  ARISTOPHANES, supra note 7,  at 897  [Ar.  Wasps 897];  1 DEMOSTHENES, supra note 8, at
51-52  [Dem.  27.67];  2  DEMOSTHENES,  supra note 8,  at  168  [Dem. 45.46];  4 DEMOSTHENES,  supra
note 8,  at 48  [Dem. 58.19];  DEMOSTHENES, supra  note 78, at 65 [Dem. 56.43].
87.  As a practical matter, Athenian jurors had little control over the specific penalty imposed after
a conviction.  For  some offenses,  the penalty was fixed  by statute.  For others, the jury chose  between
the penalties  proposed by the opposing parties during a second  round of speeches.  See supra note 49
and accompanying  text. A juror who believed that  the defendant was  guilty of the charge but did not
deserve  to  suffer the  fixed  or probable penalty  was  more  likely to vote  to  acquit  than (in the  cases
where the penalty was  not fixed)  to assume  in the absence of deliberation that his  fellow jurors shared
his  desire  for  a  lenient sentence  and  that  the  defendant  would  propose  a more  acceptable  penalty.
Some scholars  have argued that modem jurors should be informed of the  sentencing consequences of
finding a  defendant guilty where  the sentence  is  largely determined  at the trial  stage, such  as  in  the
case of mandatory  minimum  penalties. See M.  Heumann  & L.  Cassack,  Not-So-Blissful Ignorance:
Informing Jurors About  Punishment in  Mandatory Sentencing Cases, 20  AM.  CRIM.  L.  REv.  343
(1983);  Kristen  Sauer,  Informed  Conviction: Instructing the  Jury About  Mandatory Sentencing
Consequences, 95 COLUM.  L. REv.  1232 (1995).
88.  See, e.g.,  1 DEMOSTHENES, supra note 8,  at  51-52 [Dem. 27.66-69]; 2  DEMOSTHENES, supra
note 8, at  178  [Dem. 45.85];  HYPERIDES, supra note 63,  at 1.19  [Hyp.  1.19]; 3 ISOCRATES, supra note
65,  at  163 [Isoc.  16.47];  LYSIAS,  supra note  37, at 116,  151,  153-54,  156,  161,  163  [Lys. 9.22;  18.27;
19.33,  53;  20.34; 21.25].  Johnstone shows that nearly half of defense speeches include a verbal appeal
to the jurors'  pity. See JOHNSTONE, supra note 10, at  111.
89.  JOHNSTONE, supra note  10, at 113,
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situation. Particularly common were appeals that an adverse verdict would
leave  the  defendant's  family  without  support or the  means  to dower  its
unmarried women,90 and that failure to pay  the penalty would  lead to the
defendant's  loss  of citizen rights.91 Alcibiades  the  Younger, for example,
explains that the five-talent penalty carries more serious consequences  for
him  than  for  other  defendants:  "For  even  though  the  same  legal
punishments  apply  to  all,  the  risk  is  not the  same  for  everyone:  rather,
those who have money  suffer a fine, but those who are impoverished,  as I
am,  are  in danger  of losing their civic  rights....  Therefore  I beg  you to
help me  . ... "-92 Athenian notions  of relevance  in the popular  courts  thus
extended to information regarding  the  concrete effects that laws and legal
decisions had on the lives of individuals. Unlike modem jurors and judges,
Athenian  jurors  were  constantly  made  aware  of the violence  inherent  in
their judicial  decisions. 9 3  Discussion of the  effects  of an adverse  verdict
thus  served to  assist the jury in determining  whether a conviction was  a
just result given all of the circumstances,  including the severity and effects
of the likely penalty.
C. Arguments Concerning the Character  of  the Litigants
The  third and  most common  type  of extra-legal  argumentation  in  our
surviving  popular court  speeches  is the liberal  use  of character  evidence,
which  occurs  in  70  out  of 87  cases. 4  Litigants  present  themselves  as
upstanding citizens by describing their pubic  services,  participation in the
army, and familial piety, and they criticize their opponents  for everything
from failing to pay taxes and having a prior record to low birth and sexual
deviance.95  In several cases, litigants preface their character evidence with
an  explicit  explanation of why  it is  relevant to the jury's decision.  These
passages, along with other aspects  of the way in which  character evidence
is used in our surviving speeches,  suggest that discussion of character was
considered  relevant  both  to  discovering  the  truth  and  to  determining
whether  the  defendant  deserved  the  prescribed  or  likely  penalty.  Of
course, it is difficult to pinpoint the intended effect of any particular piece
of evidence;  discussions  of character  likely  operated  on more  than  one
90.  1  DEMOSTHENES,  supra note 8,  at 61  [Dem. 28.19];  LYSIAS,  supra note 37,  at  153-54,  163
[Lys.  19.33;  21.24-25].
91.  3 ISOCRATES,  supra note 65,  at 153  [Isoc. 45-46];  LYSIAS, supra note 37, at  148,  115-16,  161
[Lys.  18.1; 9.21; 20.34].
92.  3  ISoCRATES, supra note 65, at  153 [Isoc.  16.47].
93.  Cf  Robert Cover,  Violence  and the  Word, 95  YALE L.J.  1601  (1986)  (discussing how  the
process of modem legal interpretation tends to push the  reality of law's violence into  the background
of legal officials'  minds.).
94.  Speeches in maritime  suits and homicide cases are not included in this calculation.
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level  of meaning. 6 Nevertheless,  the  liberal  use  of character evidence  in
our surviving  speeches  is more  plausibly explained  as part of the attempt
to reach  a just resolution of the case, rather than  as part of a competition
for elite prestige and honor in which the jury aimed to pick a favorite.
The first justification  for character evidence  we meet  in the  speeches is
that it assists the jury in finding facts through an argument  from eikos, or
probability.9 7 Since the Athenians  tended  to view character  as  stable  and
unchanging,98 evidence  that a defendant had committed crimes  in the past
or  otherwise  exhibited  bad  morals  was  considered  highly  probative  of
whether he was  guilty of the  offense charged and whether he  was  telling
the truth in the present speech.99 Thus, for example, one speaker states:  "If
you  knew the  shamelessness  of Diocles  and what  sort of man he  was  in
relation  to  other matters,  you would  not  doubt  any  of the things  I have
said."' 00  In  a world without modem  techniques  of forensic  investigation
and evidence-gathering,  character was all the more relevant to factfinding;
in  the  absence  of  hard  evidence,  character  was  a  proxy  for  guilt  or
innocence.  Another speaker cites his clean record and meritorious  service
to the city before arguing, "You ought to take these things as proof for the
purpose of this case that the charges against me are false."''
The  second  reason  given  for  the citation  of character  evidence  is
that  it  is  relevant  to  the  jury's  assessment  of  whether  the  defendant
deserves  the penalty  for the charge or should be given pardon. 1 0 2 To  cite
just one example,  a prosecutor engages  in an extended character  attack on
Aristogeiton,  noting  that he failed to support or properly  bury his  father,
had  been convicted  on  several charges  in the past, and was  even  so base
that his fellow  criminals  in prison voted  to shun him. He then asserts  that
Aritogeiton has forfeited  any right to a lenient penalty:  "Do  you still wish
to  hear  arguments  from  us  about the punishment  for Aristogeiton,  when
you know well  on the basis of both his  whole life and  the  things  that he
has done now he would justly suffer the extreme sanction?"' 3
It has been pointed out that character evidence focuses most commonly
96.  Carey, supra  note 76, at 42-43.
97.  See JOHNSTONE, supra note  10, at 96;  SAUNDERS,  supra  note 78, at  113.
98.  See  KENNETH J.  DOVER,'GREEK POPULAR MORALITY  88-95  (1974).
99.  E.g.,  DEMOSTHENES,  OATInoNEs  20.141-42  (S.H.  Butcher ed.,  Oxford  Univ.  Press  1966)
[Dem.  20.141-2];  1  DEMOSTHENES, supra note 8,  at 48  [36.55]; 4 DEMOSTHENES, supra note 8, at 51
[Dem.  58.28]; HYPERIDES, supra note 63,  at 1.14-5  [Hyp.  1.14-15];  ISAEUS, supra note 37, at 127  [Is.
8.40].
100.  ISAEUS, supra  note 37, at 127.  [Is. 8.40].
101.  HYPERIDES,supranote63,at  1.18  [Hyp. 1.18].
102.  See SAUNDERS,  supra note 78, at 113-18 (discussing  litigants'  use of the defendant's record
to assess whether he deserves the penalty).
103.  2  DEMOSTHENES,  supra note  8,  at  172-73  [Dem.  45.63];  DINARCI-US,  ORATIONES  CUM
FRAGMENTIS  58, 66  (N.C.  Conomis ed., Teubner  1975)  [Din. 2.  11;  3.5];  3  ISOCRATES, supra note 65,
at 178,  197  [Isoc.  18.47; 20.13]; LYSIAS,supra note 37, at  161,  183  [Lys. 20.34; 30.6].
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on  the  defendant  rather  than  the  prosecutor.1
04  The  emphasis  on  the
defendant  alone,  as  opposed  to  both  the  defendant  and  the  prosecutor,
supports  the  view  that the frequent  citations  to character  are  designed to
assist the jury in reaching their verdict, rather than used as ammunition  in
a  contest for honor:  the defendant's  reputation  and record  is part  of the
contextual  information  considered by  the jury  in  determining  whether  a
conviction  is warranted.1 0 5 Although  there are  a  handful of passages  that
suggest  an  extra-legal  purpose  for  the  citation  of character  evidence-
most notably,  statements  that the jury  should acquit  a defendant because
he has performed  expensive  public  services in  the past and, if victorious,
will continue  to do  so in the future° 6-- the bulk of the evidence  suggests
that  the  liberal  use  of arguments  from  character  reflect  the  Athenian
popular  court's  highly  individualized  and  discretionary  mode  of
decisionmaking.  In sum, the prevalence  of extra-legal argumentation,  such
as  information  regarding  the background  of the  dispute,  appeals  to  pity,
and character  evidence,  indicates not that the courts  functioned primarily
as  a form of social  drama, but that the Athenians had an  extremely broad
notion of relevance in the popular courts.
D. The use of law in popular  court speeches
The Athenians'  broad  view of relevance  in the popular  courts extended
beyond the inclusion of extra-legal argumentation to the discussion of law.
Rather than  focus  on  the  elements  of the  particular  charge  at  issue  and
apply them to the facts of the case, Athenian litigants at times cite an array
of laws that do not govern the charges in the case, 1 07 and at other times do
not deem  it relevant  to  discuss-or even mention-the  law  under which
the  suit was brought. 8 A brief examination  of the  peculiar  treatment  of
statutes  in  the  popular  courts  suggests  that  statutes  and  legal  argument
served to assist the jury  in obtaining  a broad view of the individual  case
before  it,  rather  than  focusing  the  dispute  on  one  or  a  few  points  of
104.  See JOHNSTONE,  supra note 10, at 94; RUBrNSTEiN,  supra note  10, at 195.
105.  In  fact,  the  instances  where  prosecutors  do  cite  their  public  services  tend  to  be  cases
involving  inheritance  and cases  where  the  prosecutor  argues  that  his  honor has  been  violated,  for
example  assault  prosecutions.  JOHNSTONE,  supra note  10,  at 98-100.  The  prosecutor's  character  is
relevant  to  the  resolution of  the  dispute  in  these  types  of  suit, because  in  inheritance  cases  it  is
pertinent  to whether  the  prosecutor  deserves  to  own  the  property under  the  circumstances,  and  in
assault cases it is relevant to the seriousness of the crime.
106.  1 DEMOSTHENES, supra note 8, at 61-62  [Dem. 28.24]; IsAEUS,  supra note 37, at 98,  111  [Is.
6.61; 7.38-42]; LYSIAS,supra note 37, at 151,  157,  163 [Lys.18.20-21;  19.61; 21.25].
107.  For example,  speakers  sometimes  cite laws to bolster their portrayal  of the character  of the
parties,  M.  DeBrauw,  Listen  to  the Laws  Themselves:  Citations of Laws  and the Portrayal of
Character  in Attic Oratory, CLASSICAL  J. 161-76  (2001-2),  or  to  create  the general  impression  that
their position  is  supported  by  the  laws,  see Carey, supra note  76, at 44-45; Andrew  Ford, Reading
Homer from  the Rostrum:  Poems and Laws  in Aeschines'  Against Timarchus, in  PERFORMANCE
CULTURE AND ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY  231 (Simon Goldhill et al.,  eds. 1999).
108.  E.g., HYPERIDES,supra note 63  [Hyp. 3]; LYSIAS,supra note 37  [Lys. 30].
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disagreement concerning the relevant law.
The speech in Demosthenes 42, Against Phaenippus,  illustrates popular
court litigants'  lax  approach  to the statute under  which  a suit  is brought.
This  case  involved  an  antidosis ("exchange"),  one  of the  more  peculiar
procedures  in Athenian law. In the absence of universal taxation, wealthy
Athenians  were  appointed  to perform  expensive  public  services,  such  as
outfitting  a warship  or paying for a dramatic  festival. Under the antidosis
procedure,  a man  could seek  to avoid an  assigned  liturgy by proposing  a
richer  man  to  perform  the  service  in  his  stead.' °9  By  doing  so,  he
challenged  the allegedly wealthier man to choose between carrying out the
liturgy or exchanging all of his property  with the challenger. If he chose to
make  the  exchange,  the  parties  were  required  by  law  to  produce  an
inventory  of their property  within  three  days,  and each  was permitted  to
inspect the other's  estate and seal the doors of storage rooms  and the like
to prevent his opponent from concealing  or removing  any of his property.
It seems  unlikely  that  exchanges  took  place  very  often,  if at  all;  more
commonly, the second man would refuse both options and the case would
be  brought  before  a jury  to  determine  which  party  should  perform  the
liturgy.  If a  challenge  to  an  exchange  was  accepted,  but the  challenger
believed that the exchange was not being properly or honestly carried out,
he  had the  right to  abandon  the  exchange  and  demand  a  trial.  In  such  a
case, the jury was  to decide  simply which party  was required to perform
the public  service;  by  bringing  the  suit to trial the parties had  terminated
the  agreement  to  exchange  property,  and  any violations  of the  antidosis
procedure  were not formally before the court."I
The  speaker in Demosthenes  42 initiates  such a  suit after his  opponent
Phaenippus  initially  agreed  to  an  exchange  but  failed  to  produce  the
required  inventory  on  time  and  allegedly  attempted  to  conceal  the  true
value of his property by removing grain, timber, and wine  from his estate
and  claiming  various  debts  on  the  farm  that  did  not exist. Although  the
relevant law calls for the jury simply to determine which party  is wealthier
and  therefore  liable  to  perform  the  liturgy,  the  speaker  focuses  on  his
opponent's  violation of the law requiring the presentation  of an inventory
within three  days: his  opening suggests  that it is the violation of this law
that is the basis for his suit; he has the statute read out in the course of his
speech;  and he  expects the jurors to consider this  violation along  with the
relative wealth of the parties in reaching their decision:
I beg all of you,  gentlemen of the jury, that if I demonstrate that this
man  here,  Phaenippus,  has  both  violated the just  regulations  in  the
109.  See, e.g.,  2 A.R.W.  HARRISON, THE LAW OF ATHENS 236-38 (1971)  (discussing the antidosis
procedure);  MACDOWELL,  supra note 25, at 161-64  (same).
110.  1 DEMOSTHENES,  supra note  8, at 60  [Dem. 28.17];  3  IsOcRATES, supra  note 65, at 95  [Isoc.
15.51]; see also  MACDOWELL,  supra  note 25, at  163-64.
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law  [requiring  the  production  of the  inventory]  and  is  richer  than  I
am, to help  me and put this  man instead  of me on the  list of Three
Hundred [liable to liturgies]. 1'
The  loose  approach  of the  speaker  in  Demosthenes  42  to  the  formal
charge  is  in  keeping  with  the  general  Athenian  reluctance  to  rely  on
arguments  that  might  be  perceived  as  based  on  procedural  or  legal
technicalities.  For  example,  litigants  note  when  their  opponent  has
violated  the relevant  statute of limitations,  but do not  argue that the  case
should be decided on these grounds."1
2
Even  discussions  of  the  specific  charge  at  issue  left  much  to  the
discretion of the jury because Athenian  laws were vague. Generally,  as  is
often pointed out, Athenian  laws simply state the name of the offense,  the
procedure  for  bringing  suit  under  the  law,  and  in  some  cases  the
prescribed penalty; our surviving  laws and decrees do not define the crime
or describe  the essential  characteristics  of behavior  governed by the law.
The decree of Cannonus  is characteristically vague about the definition of
the offense  even though it provides detailed  instructions for the method of
trial and penalty: "If anyone wrongs the people of Athens,  then that  man,
while chained up, is to be tried before the people, and if he is found guilty,
he is to be killed by being thrown into a pit and his money confiscated and
a tithe given to the goddess."'  3
There  is  evidence  that  some  viewed  the  vagueness  of the  laws  as  a
merit:  The Athenaion Politeia  reports  that "some  men think that  [Solon]
deliberately  made  the  laws  unclear  in  order  that the  demos  would  have
power  over  the  verdict.""' 4  The  absence  of  carefully  defined  laws
specifying the required elements  of each charge invited litigants to bring a
wide  range of arguments  to bear  on the case.  In  many cases,  the primary
purpose  of the  relevant  law  may  have  been  to  set  out  a  procedure  for
obtaining  redress  for  a  broad  class  of offenses;  once  the  case  came  to
court,  the  jury  attempted  to  arrive  at  a  just  verdict  by  looking  at  the
individual  case  as  a whole,  without  focusing  exclusively  on  determining
whether  the  defendant's  behavior  satisfied  the  formal  criteria  of the
specific charge at hand.
This is not to say that Athenian litigants  could not, or did not, use legal
reasoning to argue  for a particular  interpretation of a vague or ambiguous
111.  2  DEMOSTHENES,  supra note 8,  at 79-80 [Dem. 42.4].
112.  1 DEMOSTHENES,  supra  note  8,  at  143  [Dem.  33.27;  38.17];  see  also  P.C.  MilleU,  Sale,
Credit,  and Exchange,  in  NOMOS,  supra  note  11,  at  14.  See  generally  J.F.  Charles,  Statutes  of
Limitations at Athens  (1938)  (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard  University).
113.  XENOPHON,  HELLENICA  1.7  (E.C.  Marchant  ed.,  Oxford  Univ.  Press  1961)  [Xen.  Hell.
1.7.20]; see also DEMOSTHENES,  supra note 73,  at  116 [Dem.  21.47]  (quoting the law  against hubris,
which begins simply: "If  anyone commits hubris....");  DAVID COHEN,  THEFT IN ATHENIAN LAW  6-7
(1983)  (discussing the lack of definition in Athenian laws).
114.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at 7 [Ath.PoL 9.2].
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law. 15 A common  strategy  was to rely  on the legal  fiction that  the  laws
were  created  by  a  single  lawgiver  and  thus  formed  a  coherent  whole,
making  it  possible  to  use principles  from  unrelated  laws  to  interpret  a
particular  law. "6 For  example,  Isaeus'  speech,  On  the Estate of Ciron,
includes  an argument  that attempts  to resolve  a gap in the  law that states
that in the absence of a male heir a female child can inherit as an epikleros
("heiress") ahead  of collateral relatives  such as  the  deceased's  brother  or
nephew,  but does  not  specify  whether  such  a woman's  child  may  also
inherit  ahead  of a  collateral.' 1 7  The  speaker  attempts  to  establish  that  a
daughter's  son takes  precedence  over a  brother's  son  by  presenting  two
related  laws and arguing from the apparent logic of the inheritance  system
as  a whole.  The speaker argues first that since a daughter inherits before a
brother,  a  daughter's  child  therefore  should  inherit  before  a  brother's
child."'  He  bolsters  his  argument  by  quoting  the  law  under  which
descendants  are  obliged  to  support their  indigent  and infirm  parents  and
grandparents,  while collaterals have no such obligation."  9 By arguing that
if a  man  is  legally  bound  to  support  his  grandfather,  he  therefore  has  a
corresponding  right  to  inherit  his  estate,  the  speaker  presupposes  a
coherent  system  underlying  the  inheritance  laws  that  can  be  used  to
interpret an ambiguous  law. 2'
As ingenious and potentially persuasive as these types of arguments are,
it is striking that legal reasoning was not considered an authoritative guide
to a verdict; interpretation  and application of the law at issue was certainly
considered relevant to the jury's decision,  but there  is no indication that a
litigant  was  expected  to  limit  himself  to,  or  even  focus  on,  such
questions.121 In fact, discussion of the relevant laws was only one weapon
in an  Athenian  litigant's arsenal.  The speaker  in  On the Estate of Ciron
follows  his  legal  argument  that  descendants  take  precedence  over
collaterals  with  an extended  character  attack  on his  opponent  Diocles: 122
115.  Several  scholars  have  studied  legal  argumentation  in  the  speeches.  See, e.g.,  MICHAEL
HILLGRUBER,  DIE ZEHNTE  REDE  DES  LYSIAS  105-20  (1988);  JOHNSTONE,  supra note  10,  at  20-45;
Harris, supra note 15, passim.
116.  See JOHNSTONE, supra note  10, at 25-33.
117.  The law is quoted in 2 DEMOSTHENES, supra note 8, at 112 [Dem. 43.51].
118.  ISAEUS, supra  note 37, at  123  [Is. 8.311.
119.  Id.  at  125 [Is. 8.34].
120.  Another example occurs  in Hyperides  3. The speaker bought two slaves and was  fooled into
signing a sales contract that made him responsible  for the (quite  substantial) debts previously incurred
by the slaves. The  law of contract  stated simply that agreements  are binding, and the speaker attempts
to read into law a provision voiding unjust contracts by citing a variety of laws that cast doubt on  the
validity  of contracts  in other contexts:  he cites a  statute  permitting  a man  who unknowingly  buys  a
slave with physical  disabilities to return him, a law invalidating  wills made under the  influence of old
age, insanity,  or coercion, a statute  prohibiting telling lies in the agora,  and a law stating that children
are only legitimate if the marriage was lawful. HYPERIDES, supra  note 63, at 3.15-16 [Hyp. 3.15-18].
121.  See TODD, supra note  10, at 59-60 (noting the persuasive  but nonbinding nature of statutory
law in Athens).
122.  Although Diocles  was not a litigant in this suit, the speaker presents him as his true opponent
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he  details  his  past plots  to  defraud,  deprive  of citizen  rights,  and  even
murder various family members, and in a surprising crescendo, he ends his
speech  with  a  deposition  attesting  that  Diocles  was  caught  as  an
adulterer.  123
In  modem  legal  systems,  one  of the  primary  functions  of  law  is  to
provide  a  means  to  focus  a  dispute  on  one  or  a  few  aspects  of
disagreement  recognized  by  the  relevant  law.  As  White  notes,  law
"compel[s]  those who  disagree  about  one thing to  speak  a  language that
expresses their actual or pretended agreement about everything else."' 24 In
Athens, law served no such purpose; the legal charge provided a means to
get a dispute before  a jury and served as an important source for litigants'
arguments,  but  did  not  serve  to  narrow  the  range  of information  and
argument that was considered relevant to the jury's decision.
E. The jury's evaluation of extra-legal  and legal argumentation
We  have  seen  that  both  extra-legal  and  legal  argumentation  were
considered relevant  in the popular  courts. Although  modem  accounts  of
the  Athenian  legal  system  tend  to  emphasize  one  or the  other of these
types of material, neither  is dominant  in the  surviving sources,  and most
orations  include  a  mixture  of  contextual  and  legal  argumentation. 2 '
Isaeus'  On the Estate of Ciron (discussed  above) illustrates the balance of
legal and extra-legal argumentation found in many popular court speeches.
The speaker devotes roughly  the  same amount of effort to explaining  that
the law favors  descendants  over collaterals  as he does to  arguing that his
opponent Diocles does not deserve to enjoy the fruits of the estate.'26
How did an Athenian jury go about  evaluating the mass of information
and  argument,  both  contextual  and  legal,  presented  in  a  popular  court
case? Athenian juries  offered  no reasons  for their verdicts,  and we  rarely
know the outcome of the cases for which speeches  are preserved. One clue
is an enigmatic  and controversial  phrase in the oath which was sworn each
year  by  the  panel  of  potential  jurors.  According  to  the  standard
reconstruction,  the oath  stated in part:  "I  shall  vote according  to the laws
in the  dispute.
123.  ISAEUS,supra note 37, at  125-28 [Is. 8.36-44].
124.  WHITE, supra  note 69, at 179.
125.  There is some variation  in  the distribution of contextual  and legal material  in various types
of speech.  Most notably,  defendants  focus  more  on  extra-legal  information  and argumentation  than
prosecutors,  who  tend  to  rely  more  heavily  on  the  law  in  constructing  their  arguments.  See
JOHNSTONE,  supra note  10,  at  49-60. Of course,  Athenian  prosecutors  did  regularly  use  contextual
information. E-g., DEMOSTHENES,  supra note 78, at 23-33  [Dem. 54];  DINARCHUS, supra note  103,  at
11-72  [Din.  1;  2;  3]; LYSIAS,  supra  note  8,  at 38-46  [Lys.  14].  Both ancient and modem  writers have
also  noted  that  extra-legal  argumentation  was  particularly  prevalent  in  inheritance  disputes.
ARISTOTLE,  PROBLEMS  139 (W.S. Hett ed., Harvard  Univ. Press 1937)  [Ar. Pr.  29.3]; see also COHEN,
supra note 10, at  163-81.
126.  The speaker also includes  a brief discussion of the effects an adverse  verdict would  have on
him. ISAEUS, supra note 37, at 128 [Is. 8.43-45].
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and decrees of the Athenian people and the  Council of the  Five Hundred,
but concerning  things about which there  are no  laws, I shall decide  to the
best  of my judgment, neither  with  favor nor enmity.- 127 Although  some
scholars have viewed the jurors'  oath as evidence that the jury was limited
to strictly applying the laws in all but the unusual case where there was no
controlling statute,  others have  argued convincingly  that the jurors'  "best
judgment"  (dikaiotate gnome) necessarily  played  a  much  greater  role  in
legal  verdicts,  noting particularly  the  broad  discretion  given  to juries  to
interpret and apply laws that were often vague and ambiguous.12 8
We cannot know for certain how the average  Athenian juror conceived
of  his  task,  but  surviving  speeches  suggest  that  even  the  relative
importance  of legal  and  contextual  evidence  in  any individual  case  was
open to  dispute.  Some  speakers  attempt to  focus  the jury's  attention  on
their legal arguments by reminding them of their oath to vote according to
the laws, 2 9 or by arguing that the jury should not be affected by the social
standing  of  the  litigants. 30  We  have  seen  that  others  insist  on  the
relevance  of  contextual  information,  such  as  the  defendant's  behavior
throughout  his  life'31  and  the  parties'  conduct  in  the  course  of  the
litigation.'32  As  has  often  been  pointed  out,  the  treatment  of legal  and
extra-legal  arguments  was not, however, entirely  symmetrical.  Lawcourt
speakers do not explicitly urge jurors to ignore the law in favor of fairness
and other extra-legal  considerations;  rather, they typically argue  that both
law  and  justice  support  their  claim."'  This  is  hardly  surprising.  The
general  notion  of  the  supremacy  of  law  was  central  to  Athenian
democratic  ideology,  which  held  that  adherence  to  law  was  one  of the
distinctions,  perhaps  the most  important, that  separated  democracy  from
tyranny. 3 4 To suggest explicitly that the law  was in some way inadequate
would, at worst, raise suspicion of antidemocratic  sentiment,  and, at best,
result in a serious self-inflicted wound.  Even though litigants  do not urge
the jurors to disregard the law, the explicit insistence on the relevance  and
importance of extra-legal argumentation  in many of our speeches suggests
127.  SCAFURO,  supra note  10,  at 50; see also JOHNSTONE,  supra note  10,  at  41  & nn.101-103
(discussing the reconstruction of the oath); Biscardi, supra note 79, at 222 n.20 (same).
128.  See, e.g.,  SCAFURO,  supra note  10,  at 50-51  (providing  a recent  account  of the  scholarly
controversy over the meaning of the dikastic oath).
129.  See, e.g.,  JOHNSTONE, supra note  10, at 35-42 (discussing litigants'  references to the dikastic
oath in Athenian court  speeches).
130.  3  DEMOSTHENES,  supra  note  8,  at  71  [Dem.  52.1-2];  3 ISOCRATES,  supra note  65, at  176,
203 [Isoc.  18.34-35;  20.19].
131.  See supra Section III.B.
132.  See supra Section III.A.
133.  See, e.g., CHRIST, supra  note 10, at 195; Carey, supra note 76, at 41.
134.  Aeschines'  remark is typical: "It  is agreed that there are three types of government among  all
men: tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy.  Tyrannies and oligarchies  are run according  to the character
of their leaders, while democratic cities  according to the established laws."  AESCHINES,  supra  note 46,
at 2-3  [Aesch.  1.4].
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that it was accepted  that extra-legal arguments could take precedence  over
the dictates of the written law.
Even  when  the  litigants  in  a  particular  case  did  not  explicitly  argue
about the relative importance of legal  and contextual evidence,  they could
make  very  different  choices  about what types  of evidence  to  include and
emphasize  in  their  speeches.  The  dispute  over  the  honorary  crown
awarded  to Demosthenes,  one  of the  few cases  in which  the  speeches  of
both  speakers  survive,  illustrates  the  lack  of consensus  on  the  relative
importance  of legal and extra-legal  argumentation. Aeschines,  who  failed
to win  even  one-fifth of the jurors'  votes,  opens  his  speech  with a  long
discussion  of the  relevant  laws,135 while  Demosthenes  responds  to these
legal arguments  in a mere nine sections, and does so an inconspicuous  part
of his  speech. 136  Such  a  situation,  in which the jurors  are  presented with
two  contrasting  views  of "the  case,"  each  of which  employs  a  radically
different  balance  between  legal  and  extra-legal  argumentation,  suggests
that  neither  form  of  argumentation  was  considered  decisive  or  even
superior to the other.
In sum, there  was no authoritative rule of decision in Athenian popular
courts;  the jury panel was  typically presented  with a highly particularized
and contextualized  account of the facts  and law relating  to a dispute,  and
left to its  own  devices to arrive at a just resolution  to the individual case.
However, the Athenians did not employ this flexible approach to justice in
all  legal  contexts.  In  the  remainder of this article,  I describe  the  special
procedures  used  for homicide  and maritime  cases and  attempt  to  explain
these variations.
V. THE HOMICIDE COURTS
The  scholarly  debate  over Athenian notions  of law  and the role  of the
courts in Athenian  society has  so far focused on speeches delivered  in the
popular courts.'
37  As  we have  seen,  in the  popular courts  the  laws were
largely  undefined,  and  the  litigants  observed  no rule  of relevance.  But
there were  also  special  homicide  courts-highly respected,  seldom  used,
and  largely  omitted  from  modem  discussions of lawcourts'  aims.  These
courts-which  almost  certainly  developed  earlier  than  the  popular
courts-reportedly  employed  a  rule  prohibiting  statements  "outside  the
issue."  Additionally,  they  applied  laws  that  exhibited  greater  legal
135.  Id. at 189-211  [Aesch. 3.8-48].
136.  DEMOSTHENES,  ON  THE  CROWN  59-61  (Harvey  Yunis  ed.,  Cambridge  Univ.  Press  2001)
[Dem.  18.111-120].  For  discussion  of which  orator  had  the  better  legal  case,  compare  William
Gwatkin, Legal Argument in  Aeschines'  Against Ktesiphon and Demosthenes'  On  the  Crown, 26
HESPERIA  129 (1957) with Harris, supra note  16, at  141.
137.  See supra note  17; see also supra notes  11-16 and accompanying  text (describing  the current
debate over the nature of litigation in Athens).
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definition  and  substantive  content than  those used  in the popular courts.
The unusual procedures of the homicide  courts made these courts (at least
in  theory)  far  more congenial  than  popular  courts  to  arguments  directly
related  to  the  charge,  and  less  receptive  to  extra-legal  argumentation.
Largely  for  this  reason,  the  Areopagus  (the  most  prominent  of  the
homicide courts) was widely praised as Athens'  finest court.
The  formalism  of  the  homicide  courts  arose  for  historical  reasons
largely unrelated to conventional  rule-of-law justifications.  Once in place,
however,  these  courts  served  as  an  example of a  more  uniform,  certain,
and predictable  approach,  in contrast  to which the Athenians  defined  and
debated  the  flexible  and  discretionary  system  of the  popular  courts.  The
distinctive  features of the homicide courts  reveal that the Athenians  could
conceive  of-and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  put  into practice-a  system  that
encouraged  the regular application of abstract rules without regard for the
broader social context of the dispute. Yet they rejected this model in favor
of a  more  discretionary  approach  in their  popular  courts.  This  decision
reflects  both  a  normative  belief  in  the  importance  of  contextual
information  in  reaching  a  just  decision  and  a  desire  to  give  juries
unfettered  discretion  in  the  new  democracy.  Nevertheless,  the homicide
courts  remained  more highly  esteemed.  The  idealization  of the  homicide
courts,  and  particularly  the relevancy  rule,  reveals  a  deep  tension  at  the
heart of the Athenian legal system.
A.  Relevance in the homicide courts
We have seen that Athenian  laws typically do not define the elements of
offense,  and  that  in  the popular  courts  the  charge under  which the  case
was brought  was not considered  the authoritative  guide to the verdict. 38
The  homicide  statutes  are  unusual  in  that  they  include  significant
substantive  content.  The  lawful  homicide  statute,  for  example,  lists
specific  situations  in  which  homicide  is  not  punishable,  such  as  self-
defense  in  a robbery,  accidentally  killing  a  comrade  in  war or  a fellow
athlete  during an athletic competition, or killing  an adulterer caught in the
act. 1 39  There  was  no  general  provision  exempting  just  or  morally
defensible  killings  from  punishment,  and  it  appears  that  defendants
pleading  lawful  homicide  were  obliged  to  argue  that  their  case  was
covered by an existing statute.
1 40
Homicide  and  wounding" 4-both  charges  within  the  purview  of the
138.  See supra  notes  113,  121-23 and accompanying text.
139.  DEMOSTHENES, supra note  99, at 23.53  [Dem. 23.53].  This list is  not exclusive;  there were
other laws that provided  for  further types of lawful  homicide, but in  each  case the  law  describes the
specific form of killing that is permitted. See, e.g., id. at 23.28, 60; 24.113  [Dem. 23. 28, 60; 24.113].
140.  See  CARAWAN,  supra note 10, at 282 n. 1.
141.  The  definition  of wounding  (trauma) is unclear,  but  is  certainly  more  narrow  than  the
modem notion of assault, which was regularly tried in the popular courts under  the charge  of aikeia
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special  homicide  courts-are  the  only  cases  in  which  the  Athenians
distinguished between different mental states of the offender. A prosecutor
could not bring multiple  charges.  He had to choose whether  to prosecute
the defendant  for intentional  homicide,  a capital  charge,  or unintentional
homicide,  which  was  punishable  by  exile.  If  the  prosecutor  in  an
intentional homicide or wounding case failed to prove intent (pronoia),  the
defendant  was  to be acquitted. 42 One  would  expect that  the requirement
that the  prosecutor prove intent to  gain a  conviction would have focused
the  litigants'  arguments  on  the  mental  state  of  the  offender  and
discouraged the sort of loose approach to the legal charge found in popular
court  speeches.  Indeed,  in the three  surviving cases  involving  intentional
homicide or wounding, speakers are markedly more focused on discussing
the elements of the charge at issue, particularly  the presence or absence  of
intent, than are popular court speakers.'43
The most striking difference between the popular and homicide courts  is
that  the  homicide  courts  had  a  rule  limiting  the  use  of  irrelevant
statements.144 None of our sources gives an exhaustive  list of items which
were considered "outside  the issue" (exo tou pragmatos), but the context
of Lysias  3, Lycurgus  1, and  Antiphon  5  makes  it  clear  that  character
evidence  was  forbidden.  Two  post-classical,  and  therefore  less  reliable,
sources  add  that  litigants  were  not  permitted  to  include  a  proem  or
emotional  appeal  in  their  speeches.
145  However,  speakers  in  homicide
court cases do not shy away from appeals  to pity, and it is difficult to say
whether  such  appeals  were  in  fact  considered  relevant  in  the  homicide
courts,  or whether this  stricture  was  simply  not  as carefully  observed  in
practice as the limitation on character evidence.
We  do not know for certain how, or how strictly, the relevancy rule was
("assault").  It has been suggested, for example, that wounding was limited to assault with intent to kill,
a sort  of attempted homicide  charge, or  that  it was  akin to  assault with a deadly  weapon.  See D.D.
Phillips,  Homicide,  Wounding,  and  Battery  in  the  Fourth  Century  Attic  Orators  177  (2000)
(unpublished  Ph.D.  dissertation,  University  of Michigan)  (on  file  with the  University  of Michigan
library).
142.  ARISTOTLE,  MAGNA  MORALA  (G.  Cyril  Armstrong  ed.,  Harvard  Univ.  Press  1975)  [Ar.
Mag. Mor.  1188b30-38].  See generally DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL,  ATHENIAN HOMICIDE  LAW IN THE
AGE OF THE ORATORS  39-48 (1963)  (discussing the procedures  in the Areopagus, the court that  heard
intentional homicide and wounding  cases).
143.  The  speaker in Lysias 3 devotes nearly his entire proof section to the absence of the required
element  of pronoia. See  LYSIAS,  supra note  8,  at  29-31  [Lys.  3.28-42].  The  speaker  in  Lysias  4
similarly repeatedly emphasizes the absence ofpronoia and twice refers  to this as the crux of the case.
See  LYSIAS, supra note 37,  at  101-02  [Lys.  4-6,  12,  18].  The prosecutor  in Antiphon  1 states  at  the
outset that he will  prove that the  defendant  murdered his father intentionally  and with  premeditation,
and emphatically  repeats that  the murder was intentional. See  ANTIPHON,  supra note 8,  at 39,  43-44
[Ant.  1.3, 22, 25, 26, 27].
144.  ANTIPHON,  supra note  8, at 71,  92  [Ant.  5.11;  6.9];  LYCURGUS,  supra note  61,  at  36-37
[Lyc.  1.11-13];  LYSIAS,  supra note  8,  at  32  [Lys.  3.46];  POLLUX,  ONOMASTICON  359  (Immanuel
Bekker ed., Berolini, Friderici Nicolai  1846) [Poll. 8.117].
145.  LUCIAN,  OPERA  245-6 (M.D.  MacLeod ed.,  Oxford Univ. Press  1974) [Lucian  Anach. 19];
POLLUX, supra  note 144 [Poll.  8.117].
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enforced,  but a post-classical  source  states  that the  herald  would squelch
litigants who  strayed from  the  subject.'46  Regardless  of whether  a  formal
mechanism  for  enforcing  the  relevancy  rule  existed  or  whether  those
judging cases in the homicide  courts would simply make their displeasure
known  to a litigant who strayed from the point, our sources reveal that it
was widely believed that extra-legal  material had no place in the court of
the Areopagus  and, by association,  the  other homicide  courts. 1 47 Several
passages  praise  the Areopagus  for basing  their  decisions  on  the narrow
factual and legal issues in the case and ignoring  extra-legal considerations,
particularly  evidence  relating  to the  character  and  social  standing of the
litigants.48 One speaker in a popular court case, for example, bemoans the
tendency  of popular  court  speakers  to  "make  accusations  and  slanders
about  all  things  except  the  subject  matter of the vote  on  which you  are
about to cast,"  and urges the jurors to adopt the more narrow approach  of
the Areopagus:
And you are the cause of this state of affairs,  gentlemen, for you
have  given this  authority  to those  who  come  before  you here,  even
though  you have in the Areopagus  court the  most noble  example  of
the  Greeks.  ...  Looking  to  [the  Areopagus]  you  should  not  allow
them to speak outside the issue.'49
Another  states  that  if he  had  been  prosecuted  in  a homicide  court,  the
prosecutor  would  be  limited  to  arguing  only  that  he  was  guilty  of the
specific  crime  in the charge,  "with the result that, if I had done many bad
acts,  I would not be convicted for any reason other than the charge itself,
and,  had  I done  many good deeds,  I  would not be saved because  of this
good  conduct."'50  In  the opening  of the Rhetoric, Aristotle  suggests  that
the Areopagus'  relevancy rule  places  the discussion  in that court outside
the realm of rhetoric  and  states  that if all  trials  observed  this  rule  there
would be nothing left for a rhetorician to say.'5' A  statement by the  post-
146.  LUCIAN,  supra note 145 [Lucian Anach. 19]. Plato suggests a similar mechanism  in his ideal
legal system presented  in the  Laws. See PLATO,  LAWS  (John  Burnet  ed.,  Oxford  Univ. Press  1962)
[P1., Leg. 948a8].
147.  There are very few lone references to  the other, less prominent, homicide courts,  though our
sources  tend  to treat  these  courts  as  a  group. See, e.g.,  DEMOSTHENES,  supra note 99,  at  23.73-74
[Dem.  23.73-4]. The Areopagus  apparently  came  to serve pars pro toto as a symbol  of the  homicide
courts as a whole.
148.  E.g.,  AESCHINES,  supra note  46,  at 47  [Aesch.  1.92];  ANTIPHON,  supra note  8, at  71,  91
[Ant. 5.11; 6.6];  LYCURGUS, supra note 61,  at 72 [Lyc.  1.113].  For general praise of the Areopagus  as
a  court, see  ANTIPHON, supra note 8, at  103  [Ant.  6.51]; DEMOSTHENES,  supra note 99, at  23.65-66
[Dem. 23.65-6];  LYSIAS,  supra note  37,  at  104  [Lys.  6.14];  and  XENOPHON,  MEMORABILIA  3.5.20
(E.C.  Marchant  ed.,  Oxford Univ.  Press  1971)  [Xen.  Mem.  3.5.20].  One speaker  even  makes  the
incredible  claim that "even those who have been convicted [in the Areopagus]  agree that the verdict is
just." LYCURGUS, supra note 61,  at 37 [Lye.  1.12].
149.  LYCURGUS,  supra note  61, at 36-37 [Lyc.  1.11-13].
150.  ANTIPHON, supra note 8, at 71  [Ant. 5.11].
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classical  writer Lucian,  though  not likely  to be  literally  true,  suggests  a
strong  and  remarkably  persistent  belief that  in  the  Areopagus  the  laws
were  regularly  and  impartially  applied  without  reference  to  the  social
context of the dispute or even to the identity of the litigants:  he states that
the Areopagus judged at  night in the dark  "in  order that it would not pay
attention to the man who is speaking, but only to what is said."'52
Although  in practice  the  differences  in  the mode  of argumentation  in
popular  and homicide  cases  are  not  nearly  as  sharp  as  the  Areopagus'
reputation  would  suggest,  speakers  in  the  surviving  homicide  court
speeches are more skittish about offering evidence  of their good character
or slandering  their opponents  than  are  popular court speakers.  Although
references  to  character  evidence  occur  frequently  in the  popular  courts,
litigants  in  our surviving  six homicide  speeches  employ  this  strategy  in
only three passages.5 3  In two of the three instances,  the speaker does not
mention  character  without  citing  the  relevancy  rule  and  immediately
checking  himself,  not  unlike  the  modem  trial  lawyer  who  deliberately
refers  to inadmissible  evidence  in the  hope that it  will have  an effect on
the jurors  despite  the  inevitable  admonition  from  the  bench  that  they
disregard  it. The  speaker's unease  is clear in Lysias  3, where  he  squeezes
in  a  quick attack  on his  opponent's  conduct  as  a  soldier but  stops  short
with a praeteritio.  He begins by stating,
I wish I were permitted to prove to you the baseness of this man
with  evidence  of  other  things  [i.e.,  acts  or  events  outside  the
charge]  ....  I  will exclude all the other evidence,  but I will mention
one thing which I think it is fitting that you hear about, and that will
be a proof of this man's rashness and boldness.
After briefly recounting how he assaulted his military commander and was
the only Athenian  publicly  censured for  insubordination  by the generals,
he stops himself:  "I could  say many other things  about this man, but since
it  is  not  lawful  to  speak  outside  the  issue  before  your  court....
Although  our  sources  overstate  the  differences  between  the  rules  and
procedures  of the homicide  and popular courts  and exaggerate  the effects
of  these  differences,  it  seems  that  speakers  would  make  significant
152.  LUCIAN, supra note  145,  at 67-68 [Lucian, Hermot. 64.13].
153.  LYSIAS,  supra note  8,  at 31-32,  36,  38 [Lys.  3.44-46;  7.31,  41].  In a survey  of our entire
corpus  of  court  speeches,  Johnstone  has  shown  that  defendants  were  much  more  likely  than
prosecutors to cite their liturgies and discuss issues of character.  JOHNSTONE, supra note 10, at 93-100.
The small  number  of references  to  character  in  the homicide  courts  becomes  even  more  significant
when  we consider  that all but one of our surviving homicide speeches were  delivered  by defendants.
The unusual  approach  to relevance  in  the homicide  courts  can  also be  seen by  comparing  homicide
speeches with two homicide cases brought in the popular courts through  a special procedure known as
apagoge (Antiphon  5 and Lysias  13). The speakers  in  these  two cases  make extensive use of extra-
legal material,  particularly character evidence.
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alterations  in their arguments  when appearing before a homicide court.
B. Explaining  the differences between the homicide and popular  courts
By the classical period the  homicide courts were considered-and,  to a
lesser  extent,  were--distinctive  in  their  approach  to relevance  and  legal
argumentation.  When,  how, and  why  did this  process  of differentiation
occur?  Or,  stated differently,  what  is  it  about  homicide  that explains  its
unusual treatment?  In my view, it is the peculiar development of homicide
law in the archaic period, not a sense that homicide was more serious or in
some  way  different  from  other  charges,  that  accounts  for  the  unusual
character of the homicide courts in the classical period. Although the early
history  of the homicide  courts  is  murky, the more formal,  legal  approach
of these courts appears  to reflect the concerns  of a state just beginning to
assert control  over  private violence  in the  seventh or  early sixth century
B.C. The popular court system as  we know  it in the classical  period  was
introduced about a century  later, as part of the creation of the democracy.
In constructing  the new popular  court system, the  Athenians  consciously
declined  to  adopt the strict  approach  of the  existing homicide  courts but
permitted these  courts  to continue  to decide  cases  involving  homicide  in
the traditional manner.
Classical sources  state that the unusual homicide procedures  are ancient
in  origin  and  have  remained  unchanged  since  the  time  of Draco  (620
B.C.). 55  The  relevancy  rule  of the  homicide  courts,  which  seems  so
"advanced"  in comparison  to the  free-for-all approach  to relevance  in the
popular  courts,  likely  developed  well  before the  creation  of the popular
courts and  grew  out of an urgent need to  foster obedience  to and respect
for verdicts  in a  fledgling  legal  system  that was just beginning  to assert
control  over  the  private  use  of  violence.  The  traditional  response  to
homicide  in pre-Draconian  Athens was  retaliatory  murder  carried  out by
the  victim's  family  unless  the  family  agreed  to  accept  a blood price. 156
Draco's  law  sets  limits  on  the  family's  power  over  a  homicide:
unintentional killers are to be permitted to flee the city unharmed;  at least
one  type  of justifiable  homicide  is  proclaimed  to  be  nepoinei (without
penalty);  and although  the family  retains the final decision  on whether to
accept  compensation  from  an unintentional  homicide  to permit  the killer
to remain  in the city, a finding  that a killing was unintentional  likely put
pressure on the family to do so.1' 7 The process of convincing  the relatives
155.  See, e.g.,  ANTIPHON,  supra note  8,  at  71,  90-91  [Ant.  5.14;  6.2].  The  distinction  between
intentional  and  unintentional homicide  is present  already  in  Draco's  homicide  law of 62 1/0  B.C. A
passage in Lucian describes the operation  of the relevancy rule in the  time of Solon (circa 590 B.C.),
but this source is too far removed to offer secure evidence.
156.  MICHAEL GAGARIN,  EARLY GREEK LAW 5-18 (1986).
157.  See  MICHAEL  GAGARIN,  DRAKON  AND  EARLY  ATHENIAN  HOMICIDE  LAW  30-65  (1981)
(discussing the provisions of Draco's law).
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of  a  man  who  had  been  killed  to  relinquish  the  traditional  right  of
immediate retaliation  and to abide by the findings of the homicide judges
must have been a slow and difficult one.
A relevancy  rule may have been thought to assist in this process in two
ways. First, by limiting  the judges'  discretion and discouraging  evidence
about  the  litigants'  social  background,  the  relevancy  rule  may  have
fostered a belief in the  impartiality of the judges  and thereby  encouraged
families  to  appeal  to  and  abide  by  the  results  of the  official  homicide
procedures.  Second, by forcing families to cast their arguments  in terms of
the narrow  question of the  individual  homicide,  the rule would  promote
the view that a homicide  was  an isolated event  to be resolved rather than
simply  one  part  of  an  ongoing  and  escalating  cycle  of  violence  that
reached  beyond  the  individual  killer  and  victim  to  encompass  their
families, as well.
It  was  only  after  the homicide  courts had  been  operating  for about  a
century  that  a  popular  court  system  resembling  the  classical  courts  in
structure  and function was  most likely  introduced as  part of the  creation
and development of the democracy.'58 Thus, the legalism of the homicide
courts was  available  as  a  potential model  at  the inception  of the popular
courts,  but  was  rejected  in  favor  of  a  more  flexible  approach.  The
chronological  priority of the homicide court procedures therefore belies an
evolutionary  account  of the  development  of law  and  legal  thinking  in
Athens.
Thus,  the  legalism  of the  homicide  courts  grew  out  of the  fledgling
state's attempts  to curb the violence  and social disruption associated  with
this unique crime.  Once the distinction between  the two types of lawcourt
was  established,  however,  it  seems  likely  that  it  was  inertia  and  the
tradition  of  legalism  in  the  homicide  courts,  rather  than  a  sense  that
homicide by its nature required different treatment, that led to the decision
to maintain the homicide courts  as islands of formalism in a sea of highly
informal  popular  court  cases.  Factors  such  as  the  seriousness  of  the
offense  and a concern  over pollution may also  have played a role  in the
continued  existence  of  the  homicide  courts'  strict  approach,  but  our
evidence  suggests  that  these  characteristics  of  homicide  were  less
important in the classical period than one might expect. It is not clear, for
example,  that the Athenians  shared the  modem view of homicide  as  the
158.  We  know  very  little  of the  early  history  of the  popular  courts,  which  may  have  been
introduced  anytime  between the  time of Solon (ca.  590  B.C.-i.e., prior to the  democracy)  and  the
legal  reorganization  of Ephialtes  in  the  mid-fifth  century. See, e.g.,  Mogens  Herman  Hansen,  The
Archaic Heliaia  from Solon to Aristotle, 33  CLASSICA  ET MEDIAEVALIA  9, 9-20 (1981-2)  (reviewing
the evidence  for the  early heliaia  and offering  a new proposal). My  own view is  that a popular court
system resembling that of the classical period, with selection of jurors by lot and a clear differentiation
between  the  Assembly  and  the  court,  was  most  likely  introduced  sometime  between  the  political
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most serious possible crime.  Homicide  was a private rather than  a public
matter;  it  was  only  one  of many  crimes  that  could  result  in  the  death
penalty;  and, indeed,  a man  accused  of intentional  homicide  could avoid
death  by  voluntarily  going  into  exile  after  the  first  of his  two  defense
speeches.  In  addition,  recent  scholarship  suggests  that  the  relative
importance  of  pollution  in  the  treatment  of  homicide  has  been
exaggerated,  and  that  by  the  fourth  century,  concern  over  pollution  in
relation  to  homicide  was  in  steep  decline.159  The  view  that  the
differentiation  of  the  homicide  and  popular  courts  was  not  primarily
linked  to  the  nature  of  the  crime  of  homicide  is  supported  by  the
introduction near the  end of the fifth century of an alternative  procedure
called apagoge for dealing with at least  some types  of homicide  through
the popular  court  system. 16'  Further, we  have  seen that the  praise of the
homicide  court  procedures  was  not  limited  to  their  ability  to  resolve
homicide  cases  alone. 16 1  Athenian  attitudes  toward  relevance  cannot  be
explained  simply  by  a  clear  preference  for  different  modes  of
decisionmaking when judging different types of offense.
C. The homicide courts and  Athenian notions of  law
The homicide courts'  special procedures can tell us something about the
Athenian  conception  of  law  and  the  aims  of  its  popular  courts.  The
existence of a rule  forbidding irrelevant  statements  demonstrates  that the
Athenians  were  capable  of  imagining  a  legal  process  that  entails  the
regular application  of abstract principles  to particular  cases.  There  was  a
notion  that at least  in the homicide  courts, judicial  decisions  were  to  be
based  on the narrow  legal  and  factual  issues of the case,  detached  from
their  social  context  and  without  regard  for  the  social  standing  of the
litigants.
The  antiquity  and  conservatism  of the  homicide  courts  invested  them
with great prestige,  even apart from  any perception  of the merits of their
mode of decisionmaking.  The  fact  that the  Athenians  did not introduce
similar constraining procedural  and evidentiary  rules in the popular courts
despite these  older  examples  seems  to indicate  a  conscious  reluctance  to
embrace  that  mode  of  stricter  legal  argumentation.  No  ancient  source
discusses  the  motives  behind  the  decision  not  to  emulate  the  special
procedures  and  apparent  rigor  of the  homicide  courts,  most notably  the
relevancy  rule,  in  the  popular  courts.  It  seems  likely  that  this  decision
stems  from  countervailing  values  in  Athenian  political  culture:  namely,
159.  See CARAWAN, supra note 10, at 17-19;  GAGARIN, supra note 157, at 164-67; MACDoWELL,
supra note  142,  at  144-46;  RoBERT  PARKER,  MIASMA  104-43  (1983);  I. Arnaoutoglou,  Pollution in
Athenian Homicide Law, 40 REVUE INTERNATIONALE  DES DROITS  DE L'ANTIQUITt  109 (1993).
160.  See infra note 164  and accompanying text.
161.  See supra  note 148  and accompanying  text.
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the  widespread  participation  of ordinary  men,  and  the  broad  discretion
extended to juries to temper strict legality with  equity. The broad  view  of
relevance  that  is  evident  in  the  popular  courts  reflected  not  only  a
normative judgment about  the value  of contextualized justice  but  also  a
commitment  to  popular decisionmaking  in the  new  democracy.  It is  one
thing  to  hold  that  a  wide  range  of  extra-legal  information  and
argumentation,  such as  the prior relationship and interaction  of the parties
and the effect an adverse verdict would have  on a particular defendant,  is
potentially  relevant to the resolution  of a legal dispute.  It is quite  another
to unleash  a popular jury to determine,  without  being provided  with  any
rule  of decision,  what  types  of  legal  and  extra-legal  information  and
argumentation should be credited in reaching a just decision in a particular
case.  Support for an  open-ended  system of relevance like  that used in the
popular  courts  cannot  be  separated  from  the  critical  question  of  who
decides  what  is  most  relevant  in  a  specific  case.  The  discretionary
approach  of the popular courts was  thus intimately  linked to the creation
of a  participatory  democracy  in which,  in  Aristotle's  words,  the  demos
was kurios (supreme) in all things, including the popular courts. 162
Why  did the homicide  courts not adopt the more  lax  procedures of the
popular courts in the classical period? The sheer force of conservatism and
a reluctance  to alter the traditional procedures of the Areopagus must have
played  some  role. It is  possible that the  fact that the homicide  courts did
take  into  account  the  most  important  type  of  contextual  information
relating  to  a  homicide-the  intent  of the  offender-made  it  seem  less
necessary  to reform the  homicide procedures.  The most  important  factor
may  have  been  the  rarity  of traditional  homicide  procedures.  Homicide
appears  to  have been  unusual  in Athens. 63  The  frequency  of traditional
homicide  trials  may  have  further  declined  in the fourth  century  because
apagoge, an  alternate  procedure  for  bringing  at  least  some  types  of
homicide  in the  popular courts,  was  introduced near the  end of the  fifth
century.1"  Although  the  homicide  courts  continued  to  hear  cases
throughout  the  classical  period,  the  existence  of this  alternate  homicide
procedure,  as well as the overall  infrequency of homicide  trials, may have
weakened any inclination to change the traditional homicide procedures.
Even  if the Areopagus  and other homicide courts  rarely heard cases  in
the  classical  period,  the  Areopagus  remained  prominent  in the  Athenian
162.  ARISTOTLE, supra  note 38, at 36-37  [Ath.Pol. 41.2].
163.  Our sources  mention only  fifteen cases  of homicide  between 507  and 322  B.C. See Gabriel
Herman, How Violent  Was Athenian Society?, in RITUAL,  FINANCE, POLITICS  101, supra note 23.
164.  The dating  and types of apagoge used  in homicide cases have been  the subject of scholarly
dispute  for  some  time.  See,  e.g.,  CARAWAN,  supra note  10,  at  164-67;  Michael  Gagarin,  The
Prosecution of Homicide in Athens,  20 GREEK,  ROMAN,  &  BYZANTINE  STUD.  301  (1979);  Mogens
Herman  Hansen,  The Prosecution of  Hornicide in Athens: A  Reply, 22 GREEK, ROMAN,  & BYZANTINE
STUD  11  (1981);  Eleni Volonaki,  "'Apagoge  " in Homicide Cases, 3 DIKE  147 (2000).
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legal  imagination,  serving  as  a  notional  antithesis  to  the  contextualized
approach of the popular courts. Indeed, if the homicide courts rarely sat in
judgment, that  probably  only enhanced  their reputation  by promoting  an
idealized  view  of their  operation  undiminished  by frequent  or  apparent
departures  from  the ideal. 1 65 The idealization  of the Areopagus and  other
homicide  tribunals  in the  classical  period may reflect  Athenian  anxieties
about the decisionmaking process of its mass juries. We have seen that the
praise of the Areopagus  and the homicide  courts was particularly focused
on the judges'  tendency  to ignore the social standing  and character of the
litigants. 166  The  use  of  character  evidence  in  the  popular  courts  was
controversial,  and  praise  of  the  Areopagus  may  reflect  a  widespread
unease  about  the  potential  for  misuse  of  this  type  of  information,
especially at the hands of a popular court jury. 167
The  Athenians  were  aware  of, and  uneasy  about,  the  aspects  of their
legal  system  that  discouraged  strict  legal  argument  divorced  from  the
social  context  of the  dispute.  Theirs  was  a  conscious  choice  to  favor
contextualized  justice  and  broad  jury  discretion  over  the  more  formal,
legal  approach  represented  by  the  homicide  courts.  Nevertheless,  there
appears  to  have  been  a  decided  ambivalence  about  the  decision  not  to
follow the homicide courts'  paradigm in the popular courts.
V. MARITIME  CASES
As a result of Athens'  defeat by Sparta in the Peloponnesian  War in 404
B.C., Athens lost its fleet, the benefits  of imperial tribute, and its status as
the dominant  commercial  center  of Greece.  By the  middle  of the  fourth
century the city was  near bankruptcy and in desperate need of insuring an
161 adequate  grain  supply  for  its  citizens.  It  was in  this  context  that  the
Athenians  created  a  special  procedure  for  maritime  suits,  the  dike
emporike.1 69  Dikai emporikai were  most  likely  heard  in  the  ordinary
popular  courts,  but  were  exceptional  in  three  important  respects:  (1)
foreigners,  resident  aliens  (metics), and  perhaps  even  slaves  were  given
standing  in  these  suits  equal  to  Athenian  citizens;  (2)  only  disputes
165.  On  praise  for  the  Areopagus'  method  of decisionmaking,  see  supra notes  148-52  and
accompanying text.
166.  See id.
167.  Indeed,  we  have  seen  that  litigants  in the  popular  courts  who  use  character  evidence  are
careful  to explain  how  this  contextual  information  is  relevant  to  reaching  a just result  rather  than
merely serving  as an instrument to whip up prejudice  and unprincipled emotion  among the jurors.  See
supra Section III.C.
168.  See,  e.g., SIGNE  ISAGER  & MOGENS  HERMAN  HANSEN,  ASPECTS OF ATHENIAN  SOCIETY  IN
THE FOURTH  CENTURY  11-84  (1975)  (providing  an  overview of Athenian  foreign trade  and economy
in the  early fourth  century);  CLAUDE  MOSSt, ATHENS  IN  DECLINE,  404-86  B.C.  12-17, 32-49  (1973)
(same); BARRY S.  STRAUSS,  ATHENS AFTER  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR 42-70 (1986) (same).
169.  Dike emporike (pl. dikai emporikai) refers  to  both the  special  maritime  procedure  and to a
maritime case brought under this procedure.
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concerning  written  contracts  could  be heard  through  this procedure;  and
(3) the use of special  rules providing for expedited procedures and strong
measures  to  insure  compliance  with judgments.17°  Although  no  ancient
source  explicitly discusses  the motivation  behind the  creation of the dike
emporike,  it  is  generally  thought  that  these  special  procedures  were
designed to stimulate the city's  flagging economy by encouraging  foreign
merchants to come to Athens.
In this  Part, I argue that maritime  suits,  like  Athenian  homicide  cases,
exhibit  a  distinctive  notion  of relevance.' 7'  Speeches  in  dikai emporikai
appear  to be  more focused  on the terms of the written  contract  and  less
likely  to appeal  to  extra-legal  argumentation  than  ordinary popular  court
speeches. These differences  stem from a need to facilitate  trade and attract
non-Athenian merchants  by offering a predictable  procedure that focused
on  the  enforcement  of contracts  as  written.  In this  special  context,  the
contexualized approach of the popular courts became a liability rather than
an asset.
A. Relevance in maritime suits
A  written  contract  requirement  such  as  that  used  in  the  maritime
procedure  was  unprecedented  in  Athens;  in  ordinary  popular  court
speeches,  oral  contracts  and wills  are  commonly  used  even  for complex
arrangements.1
72  It has been shown  that even where written contracts were
used,  they  seem  primarily  to  have  supplemented  the  speaker's  witness
evidence rather than to have served as decisive proof.  17 3
One  would  expect  that  the  special  requirement  of written  proof in
maritime  cases  would  focus  the  dispute  on  the  terms  of  the  written
agreement. Our surviving  maritime cases  bear out this prediction:  one  of
the  most distinctive  features  of these  speeches  is the  importance  of the
contract terms to the speakers'  arguments.'74 In the three maritime cases in
which  the  speaker  is  not  challenging  the  existence  of a  contract,  the
written  contract  is  recited  in  full  within  the  first  ten  sections  of  the
speech.
175  Of  the  113  references  to  written  contracts  in  the  entire
170.  There  is some evidence that dikai emporikai were  heard in separate courts before specialist
judges, but most scholars reject this hypothesis. Compare COHEN, supra note 55,  at 93-95  with TODD,
supra note  10,  at 336.  For  detailed  discussion  of the  unusual  features  of  the dikai emporikai, see
COHEN,  supra  note  10;  TODD,  supra note  10,  at  333-36;  and  Louis  Gemet,  Sur  les  actions
commerciales en droit ath~nien, 51 REG  1 (1938).
171.  As in the case of the homicide courts, space permits  only a partial  summary of the evidence
for the differences in argumentation in maritime and ordinary popular court suits.
172.  See, e.g., 2 DEMOSTHENES, supra note 8, at 51-70 [Dem. 41].
173.  See THOMAS supra note 40, at 40-45.
174.  See CHRIST, supra note 10, at 220-21; DEMOSTHENES, supra note 78, at 200n.50 (1985).
175.  1 DEMOSTHENES,  supra note  8,  at  155,  183  [Dem. 34.7;  35.10];  DEMOSTHENES,  supra note
78, at 57  [Dem. 56.6].
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Demosthenic  corpus,  100  occur  in  these  three  speeches  alone. 7 6
Demosthenes'  Against Lacritus is most striking  in this regard:  the speaker
discusses the contract in painstaking detail, "addressing  in turn each of the
provisions  of the written  contract,"'177  and then has  the  entire  agreement
read  out  a  second  time.17 8  The  contract  in  Dernothenes  56,  Against
Dionysidorus, did not  address  the precise  issue  in  dispute.  The  contract
provided that the lender bear  the loss if the ship was  lost at sea, and that
the  borrowers  pay  a  penalty  if they  did  not  return  with  their  cargo  to
Athens,  but  made no provision  for another contingency  rather  than  total
loss of the ship,  damage  severe  enough to preclude  the return  of the  ship
and require  that her cargo  therefore be  sold outside Athens. This  is what
the defendant  claimed to have happened, if we can trust the prosecution's
account.'79  Although  the  contract is  silent on  the crucial  question  of the
rights  of  the  parties  in  this  contingency,  the  speaker  quotes  from  the
written contract four times and repeatedly  refers the jurors  to the terms  of
the  agreement  as  the  proper  guide  to  their  decision. 8 0  It  is  not  only
speakers who are pressing their contractual  claims who emphasize that the
terms of the written contract are decisive in maritime suits. The speaker in
Demosthenes  33,  the defendant  in the original contract  action, refers  to a
written  contract  as  "the  exact  agreement,"''  and  states  that  contract
disputes are to be resolved by reference to the written document.'82
In stark  contrast to the importance  of the  contractual terms  in maritime
suits,  speakers  in  other  suits  involving  written  contracts  or wills  rarely
dwell  on the  specifics  of the  legal  instrument  or  suggest  that the jurors
should look only within the four comers  of the contract. Instead, speakers
in non-maritime  cases  appeal to general notions  of fair dealing and argue
that one or other of the parties has a superior moral  claim to the  money or
property at issue.
Demosthenes  48,  Against  Olympiodorus,  illustrates  the  diminished
importance  of the  written  instrument  in  non-maritime  contract  cases.
183
176.  See DEMOSTHENES, supra note 78, at 200 n.50.
177.  1 DEMOSTHENES, supra note 8, at 186  [Dem. 35.17].
178.  Id. at 192 [Dem. 35.37].
179.  DEMOSTHENES,  supra note 78, at 64 [Dem.  56.37].
180.  Id.  at 57, 64 [Dem. 56.6, 36, 38].
181.  1 DEMOSTHENES,  supra note 8,  at  145 [Dem. 33. 36].
182.  The speaker says:
All  men, whenever  they make  contracts  with  one another,  after  sealing the  agreement  they
deposit  it with those whom they trust, for  this reason,  that if they disagree about something, it
would  be possible  for  them  to  go  to the  written  contract  and from  this  obtain the  means  of
resolving their disagreement.
Id.
183.  Hyperides'  Against Athenogenes is another notable example. In that case, which involved  the
purchase of a slave boy, the speaker alleges that his  opponent misrepresented the extent of the slave's
debt, and that the jury should therefore  disregard the contract  even though it clearly provided that the
buyer was taking on all of the slave's liabilities. The speaker argues that the  contract should be voided
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The  speaker  is  suing  his  partner  in  crime  for  breach  of contract'8 4 for
tricking  him  out  of his  share,  and  one  would  expect  that  the  plaintiff
would  focus  on  the terms  of the agreement  in  the  absence  of equitable
sources of support for his claim. The speaker, Callistratus,  and his brother-
in-law,  Olympiodorus,  made  a  written  contract  to  divide  the  estate
belonging  to  Comon,  a  mutual  relative,  evenly  between  them  and  to
exclude  all  other  claimants.  After  the  two  managed  to  have  the  estate
awarded  to  Olympiodorus  by  colluding  in  various  misrepresentations  to
the court,  Olympiodorus  refused  to give  Callistratus  half of the estate  in
accordance with their agreement. Predictably,  Callistratus emphasizes that
his  opponent has  breached their  agreement.  Callistratus  does not rest his
claim  solely  on  the  terms  of the  contract,  however,  but  also  includes  a
number  of  arguments  rooted  in  fairness.  He  stresses  that  he  offered
Olympiodorus  a fair settlement to avoid litigation but was rebuffed, 85 and
he  requests  in the  first  instance  not  the  enforcement  of the  contract  as
written but a compromise ruling.' 8 6 He notes that he arranged for Comon's
burial, a fact often  cited by contestants  in inheritance  cases to show  their
personal connection  to the  deceased and  right to  a share  of the  estate.'87
Finally, Callistratus reports  that Olympiodorus  is unmarried and has been
wasting  all his  money  on his  mistress,  a  former  slave,  while Callistratus
has a wife and daughter to support.' 8
Thus, the speakers  in non-maritime  contract  cases  do not confine  their
arguments  to the terms  of the agreement  or suggest, as  speakers  in dikai
emporikai do,  that  the  contract  should  be  the  sole  guide  to  the jurors'
decision.'89  The narrow  focus  on the written  contract  unique  to maritime
suits  presumably  would  facilitate  business  deals  by  increasing  the
predictability  of verdicts, but would also hamper the jury's ability  to take
into account a wide range of factors in reaching its decision.
One  might expect  that the presence  of foreigners,  metics,  and perhaps
even slaves in maritime litigation would lead to a plethora of arguments in
which  the  litigant  of more  favored  status  exploits  his  superior  social
standing.  With  few  exceptions,  however,  the  social  standing,  character,
as  unjust, even  though the  Athenians  appear  to  have had no  written law voiding  a  contract that  was
unconscionable, fraudulent, or even illegal.
184.  The suit was technically a dike blabes, "an action  for damage." There  appears  to have been
no  distinctive procedure for  a breach of contract action. See TODD, supra note 10, at 266.
185.  2 DEMOSTHENES, supra note 8,  at 233 [Dem. 48.4].
186.  Id. [Dem. 48.3].
187.  Id. at 234 [Dem. 48.6].
188.  Id. at 246-47 [Dem. 48.54-55].
189.  Christ has pointed out a similar difference between cases involving banking transactions and
the dikai emporikai: while  litigants in banking  suits present their cases in  terms of a breach  ofphilia,
parties  in maritime  cases  emphasize a breach  of contract.  See CHRIST, supra note  10, at  180-91.  And,
of course,  we have seen that extra-legal argumentation  played  a central role in  suits involving  written
wills. See supra  notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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and  public  services  of the  litigants  play  no  role  in  arguments  in  the
maritime suits.' 90 Indeed, in several cases  we are unsure of the legal  status
of  the  individuals  involved  in  the  transaction.  A  narrowed  sense  of
relevance  is  also  suggested  by  the  complete  absence  of appeals  to  the
jurors'  pity,  which  we  have  seen  is  a  well-known  topos in  our  non-
maritime  popular  court  cases.  The  only  references  to  larger  policy
considerations  in  these  speeches  involve  the  importance  of  insuring
Athens'  grain supply and the necessity of enforcing  contracts as written to
facilitate  trade.'9
The  distinctive  mode  of  argumentation  in  maritime  cases  can  be
usefully  compared to  two  non-maritime  commercial  cases  that  also  date
from  sometime in the  middle  of the fourth century,  Demosthenes  36  and
37. Although the  subject matter of these two suits, the leasing arrangement
of  a  banking  business  and  a  series  of  transactions  involving  mining
property, is similar to that of maritime  suits, these speeches reflect  a much
broader notion  of relevance. Both  speakers  make  extensive  use of extra-
legal  arguments  such  as  character  evidence  and  appeals  to pity.' 9 2  Most
striking is the use  in these two speeches  of witnesses  to testify  solely to
the good character of the speaker or the villainy of his opponent.' 9 3
B. Why a different notion of relevance in maritime suits?
We have seen that speeches  in dikai emporikai seem to be more focused
on  the contractual  issue in  dispute and  less  likely  to  appeal to  evidence
regarding  the  character  and  social  standing  of the  litigants  than  similar
non-maritime  commercial  cases,  where  a  man's  reputation  for  fair
business  practices  and  other  issues  beyond  the  specific  terms  of  any
written  agreement,  such  as  fairness  and  equity,  become  relevant  to  the
jurors'  decision. It seems likely that the specific  aim of the dike emporike,
which  was  to  facilitate  trade,  especially  trade  in  grain,  by  providing  a
predictable  procedure  and  attracting  foreign  merchants,  accounts  for  the
distinctive mode of argumentation  evinced  in these suits.  The  formalism
of the  maritime  procedures  was  most  likely  an  accommodation  to  the
specific  needs  of commercial  suits,  not  an  improvement  on the popular
190.  The  one notable  exception  is Demosthenes  35,  in which the  speaker,  a citizen, reviles  his
opponents as Phaselites  and sophists. However,  even in this speech the bulk of the oration is  devoted
to a close reading of the contract, which is twice read out in full.
191.  Although  in a few cases  speakers  charge their  opponents with having  violated Athens'  grain
laws,  they  do  not  argue that  the jurors  should  vote  in  their favor  for  this  reason.  This  evidence  is
presented  as  part  of an  argument  for insuring  the  grain  supply  and  encouraging  trade  by  strictly
enforcing  written  contracts.  1  DEMOSTHENES,  supra note  8,  at  168,  197  [Dem.  34.51;  35.54];
DEMOSTHENES,  supra note 78, at 66 [Dem. 56.48].
192.  1  DEMOSTHENES,  supra  note  8,  at  204,  206-07  [Dem.  36.42,  45,  52,  55-57,  59];
DEMOSTHENES, supra note 78, at 44-45  [Dem. 37.48, 52, 54].
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court procedures;  though the dikai emporikai have more in common with
modem courts,  the  Athenians  may have  viewed  the more formal,  "legal"
approach  in maritime  cases as affording a judicial process  inferior  to the
contextualized format of the popular courts, or at least inappropriate to the
issues raised in the popular courts.
Because  of the policy of encouraging  lending  and facilitating  trade by
offering  a  predictable  procedure  that  focused  on  the  enforcement  of
contracts as written,  the wide-ranging discretion wielded by juries in non-
maritime suits became counter-productive  in maritime cases.19 4 A focus on
the terms  of the written  contract reduced  the uncertainty  associated with
the ad hoc approach taken in the Athenian popular courts and gave lenders
and traders confidence that they would be able to enforce their contracts in
court if necessary.  The  speaker  in Demosthenes  56 makes precisely  this
argument  in urging the jurors to  strictly enforce  the maritime contract  in
his suit:
For if you  think that  contracts  and  agreements  made  between  men
should  be binding,  and you will  show no forbearance  toward those
who break them, then those men who lend their own money will  do
so  more readily  and  as a result your  market  will  flourish.  For who
will want to risk his money, when he sees written contracts having no
effect,  and arguments  of this  sort  [i.e.,  contrary  to the  terms of the
agreement]  winning the  day,  and the  accusations  of criminals  being
placed before justice? 95
This reassurance  may  have been particularly important  in encouraging
lenders  and  traders  to  do  business  with  men  outside  their  close-knit
community,  including  foreigners  whose  reputation  might  not  be  well-
known,  who  might  not be  repeat  players,  and who  might not  be  easily
influenced  by the informal  norms  of the  marketplace.' 9 6  It is natural  that
the  participants  in  deals  with  strangers  would  be  less  trustful,  and
therefore  more  likely  to  want  well-defined  commitments  spelled  out in
written  contracts  and  enforced  in  a  more  formal  procedure.  Strict
enforcement  of contracts  is  an easy way  to reduce  legal uncertainty  in a
society  without  precise  legal  rules  or  legal  experts  because  it  does  not
involve  the creation of a  complex  substantive  law  but rather permits  the
contracting parties to create their own law for each deal.
The narrower notion of relevance  employed in dikai emporikai was also
vital to attracting  foreign  merchants  to Athens. Foreigners  would be  at a
194.  See  I DEMOSTHENES, supra note 8,  at 168,  197  [Dem. 34.51;  35.54]; DEMOSTHENES, supra
note  78,  at  66  [Dem. 56.48]  (speakers'  statements  regarding  the importance  of encouraging  lending
and facilitating trade by strictly enforcing written  agreements).
195.  DEMOSTHENES, supra note 78, at 66-67 [Dem. 56.48].
196.  See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER  WITHOUT LAW:  How NEIGHBORS  SETTLE DISPUTES 40-
123  (1991)  (noting that  close-knit  communities  can  order  their affairs  effectively  "without  law,"  by
reliance on trust and informal  control over anti-social behavior).
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distinct disadvantage  in the ordinary  Athenian popular  courts, where they
would  be  subject  to judgment  based  on  unwritten  Athenian  norms  and
values that they might not fully  understand, let alone  share. Few transient
foreign merchants  would have ready  access to the witnesses  necessary to
present a contextualized account of their character, reputation, and manner
of doing business. Even those who could present such a case might not be
sanguine about their chances of prevailing in an Athenian court against an
Athenian  citizen who could point to military  service and other  hallmarks
of good  character  familiar  to  popular  court juries.  The  dike  emporike
procedure,  by  focusing  on  the  terms  of  the  written  contract  and
discouraging  extra-legal  information  and  argumentation,  offered  foreign
merchants  the  chance  to  resolve  their  disputes  on  a  truly  equal  footing
with citizens based on a transparent, straightforward, and culturally neutral
standard: the terms of the written contract agreed to by the parties.
If a more formal, predictable  legal  procedure  facilitated business  deals,
one  might  ask  why  the  Athenians  employed  this  approach  only  in
maritime  cases  and  did not  adopt  it  in  other  business  contexts  such  as
banking  and  ordinary contract  cases.  We  have  seen  that Athenian jurors
valued  their  ability  to  enforce  informal  social norms  of fair dealing  and
good conduct in reaching their verdicts in the popular courts. The adoption
of a narrow relevance regime in non-maritime  cases would have detracted
from  the  democratic  juries'  ability  to wield  their influence  on Athenian
life.  In  dikai emporikai, on  the other hand,  the  common participation  of
foreigners may have isolated maritime business activity from the everyday
social  interactions  in  which  the  Athenian  juror  took  great  interest.
Although citizens did play an active role in maritime  trade, the port of the
Piraeus  was thought of as "a world apart"  from  city life, and  commercial
activity was always considered different and separate from more respected
economic  pursuits.'97  In  this  sphere,  Athenian  jurors  probably  saw  less
value  in enforcing  fair play  and ensuring  a just resolution  that took  into
account the particular circumstances  of the case.  On the other side of the
ledger were the considerable  economic advantages  associated with a more
narrow, legal approach in maritime cases. In this one area of law, the costs
associated  with  discretionary justice  outweighed  the  benefits,  and  steps
were taken to narrow the range of evidence  considered relevant to the jury
in an effort to enhance  the predictability  of verdicts  and thereby facilitate
trade.
CONCLUSION
We  see  in  classical  Athens  the  first  sustained,  well-documented
197.  See, e.g., RcHARD  GARLAND,  THE PIRAEuS  58-100 (1987);  Sita von Reden, The Piraeus-A
World Apart, 42 GREECE & ROME 24 (1995).
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approach  to  a  perennial  problem  faced  by  all  organized  societies  in
constructing  a  legal  system:  the  tension  between  adherence  to  general
rules  and  doing  justice  in  specific  cases.  Under  the  democracy,  the
Athenians  experimented  with  a  variety  of responses  to  this  problem.
Rather than impose a single mode on all cases that came before the courts,
the  Athenians  adopted  a  mixed  system, with pockets  of legal  formalism
surrounded  by  popular  courts  that  granted  juries  a  wide  degree  of
discretion. For the majority of cases, the Athenians  chose what by modem
standards is a remarkably  flexible approach to legal decisionmaking.
In this study, then, I have argued that the Athenian approach to law was
more  varied  and complex  than  has  previously been  recognized.  A  more
fine-grained description of the Athenian legal system must take account of
not only the practices of the popular courts, but also the more formal, legal
approach used in homicide  and maritime  cases. The  special homicide  and
maritime procedures  suggest that the Athenians  could  conceptualize  (and
to  a lesser  extent  implement)  a  system  that  excluded  social  context  in
favor  of  generalized  rules.  However,  in  the  vast  majority  of  cases
Athenian  jurors  produced  largely  ad hoc  decisions,  as  a wide  variety  of
extra-legal material  was  considered  relevant  and important  to reaching  a
just verdict tailored to the particular circumstances  of the individual case.
In this respect, the Athenian courts were both more and less removed from
modem  courts  than  is  commonly  believed:  the  legal  system  cannot  be
characterized  as embodying a rule of law, but the participants nevertheless
viewed the process as  aiming  at the resolution  of the dispute  rather than
unrelated social ends.  The Athenians'  distinctive approach to relevance  in
the  popular  courts  reflects  a  highly  individualized  and  contextualized
notion of  justice.
Why was context so highly  valued in Athens, in spite of its costs? Part
of  the  answer  must  be  that  although  the  nature  of  the  disadvantages
associated  with  contextualized  justice-the  dangers  of  verdicts  based
purely on prejudice,  and reduced  legal certainty and predictability-were
the  same  as  they  are  today,  the  potential  effects  of these  shortcomings
were  much  less  severe  in  a  society  that was  ethnically  and  socially  far
more  homogenous  than most  contemporary  societies.  Shared values  and
informal  social  norms must have  gone a long way  in regulating behavior
and reducing the amount of legal uncertainty.
But the most important factor was Athens' political structure as a direct,
participatory  democracy.  We  have  seen  that laypersons  tend  to  find the
restriction  of  evidence  demanded  by  formal  legal  reasoning
counterintuitive. 198 It is not  surprising  that a  system  that  entrusted legal
decisions entirely to amateurs would embrace extra-legal argumentation as
198.  See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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relevant  and  even  vital to reaching  a just  verdict.  The  flexible  approach
also  benefited  the poor citizen  males who  formed  the  dominant political
constituency of the democracy. The judicial system placed all litigants, the
rich included,  squarely in the power of the predominately poor jurors who
enjoyed the right to reach  verdicts by  whatever reasoning  they wished to
apply.  The  informality  of legal  procedures  also gave  the  poor relatively
easy  access  to  legal  remedies  and allowed  room  for  uneducated  men  to
"tell their story"  in a more-or-less  natural way. Indeed,  although no direct
expression  of the poor man's point of view  survives,  one  treatise written
by  a  man  with  oligarchic  sympathies  suggests  that  the  aspects  of the
democracy  that he  detests,  including  the judicial  system, were  rationally
seen by  the poor  and the  masses  (hoi penetes kai ho demos)  as  serving
their interests.  199  Finally, the Athenian democratic commitment to popular
decisionmaking  dictated  that  jurors  be  given  maximum  discretion  in
reaching  their decisions.  After all,  it  was not only through the Assembly
but through the popular courts that the citizenry ruled Athens.
Athens'  political culture helps to explain why what appears  to us to be
an extremely costly approach200-case-by-case  decisionmaking carried out
by juries  numbering  in  the hundreds-was  not perceived  as  such  at the
time.  For the Athenians,  popular court cases  were valuable  in themselves
because  they  gave  average  citizens  an  opportunity  to actively participate
in the  governing of their  city.20'  Moreover,  ex post jury decisionmaking
may  have  been  more  efficient  than  detailed  rulemaking  in  the  popular
Assembly, where any male citizen was permitted to propose a rule or give
a  speech  regarding  the  proposal  under  discussion.  Where  enhanced
certainty  and  predictability  were  needed  to  attract  foreign  traders  in
maritime  suits, the Athenians  avoided  the costs of rulemaking  entirely by
strictly  enforcing  the  terms  agreed  to by the parties  rather  than  creating
substantive  contracting rules.  The unusual balance between formality  and
certainty on the one hand and flexibility and fairness on the other was thus
well-suited to the political and social context of classical Athens.
The Athenian case casts doubt on evolutionary accounts of legal  history
and makes us question  our assumption that the rule  of law is the judicial
model  of  choice  for  all  democracies.  Athens  demonstrates  that  a
sophisticated legal culture may have reasons to favor equity and discretion
199.  XENOPHON,  ATHENAION  POLITEIA  221  (E.C.  Marchant  ed.,  Oxford  Univ.  Press  1966)
[[Xen.] Ath.Pol.  1.1,  13].
200.  Many modem evaluations of the choice  between rules and standards  include  analysis of the
relative costs of rulemaking and ex post discretionary decisions. See, e.g.,  Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards:  An  Economic Analysis, 42  DUKE  L.J. 557  (1992);  Eric  A. Posner, Standards,  Rules, and
Social  Norms, 21  HARv.J.L.  & PUB. POL'Y  101  (1997).
201.  Indeed, Athenians were  sometimes  buried with  their ticket for jury  service (pinakion). See
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over  the neutral  application  of generalized  rules  in  some circumstances,
and  that  such  a  choice  need  not  require  surrender  to  wholesale  legal
uncertainty  and  its resulting  burden  on commercial  transactions.  For the
Athenians,  the  "verdict  most  just ''2 0 2  was  one  reached  by  a  jury
empowered  to  consider not only  the  applicable  legal  rules,  but  also  the
broader context of the dispute and the particular circumstances of the case.
202.  A phrase  from the classical Athenian juror's oath, dikaiotate gnome. In the oath it is used as
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